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LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT

Part IV of Stops and Detentions Audit:

Initiation of Stops and Detentions Related to
Consent Searches

Antelope Valley Stations

Project No. 2025-7-A

Prepared By:

Audit and Accountability Bureau



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**Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department
Audit and Accountability Bureau**

**Part IV of Stops and Detentions Audit:
Initiation of Stops and Detentions - Consent Searches
Antelope Valley Stations
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AUDIT REPORT

PURPOSE

The Audit and Accountability Bureau (AAB) conducted the Stops and Detentions Audit under the authority of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD or the Department), pursuant to the United States Department of Justice (US-DOJ) Antelope Valley (AV) Settlement Agreement (Agreement)¹ Paragraph 149, which states:

The Monitor shall... determine whether LASD has implemented and continues to comply with the material requirements of this Agreement... Where appropriate, the monitor will make use of audits conducted by the [Audit and Accountability Bureau] taking into account the importance of internal auditing capacity and independent assessment of this agreement.

The Stops and Detentions Audit was conducted in five separate audits (Parts I, II, III, IV, and V) to provide timely feedback to Lancaster and Palmdale Stations (AV Stations). Each of the five audits addresses the requirements of the Agreement.

This audit, designed as Part IV, specifically focused on assessing initiated stops and detentions, along with consent searches related to the AV Stations' compliance with paragraphs 42, 44, 51, and 52 of the Agreement.

The Stops and Detentions Audits were conducted in the following manner:

Part	Audit
I	Backseat Detentions
II	Supervisory Review of Deputy's Daily Worksheet
III	Backseat Detentions Related to Domestic Violence
IV	Initiation of Stops and Detentions Related to Consent Searches
V	Initiation of Stops and Detentions Related to Probation or Parole Searches

¹ [Antelope Valley Settlement Agreement. No. CV 15-03174, United States v. Los Angeles County et al. \(D.C. Cal. April 28, 2015\)](#)

This audit is scheduled to be recurring. The table below lists the project numbers, due dates, and population time periods, which are subject to change.

Project Numbers, Due Dates, and Population Time Periods

Project No.	Projected Due Date	Population Time Period
2025-7-A	April 30, 2025	November 1, 2024, to December 31, 2024
2025-17-A	December 31, 2025	May 1, 2025, to June 30, 2025

The AAB conducted this audit under the guidance of Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards² (GAGAS). The AAB determined whether the evidence obtained was sufficient and appropriate to provide a reasonable basis for the findings based on the audit objectives.

BACKGROUND

On April 28, 2015, the County of Los Angeles, the Department, and the US-DOJ entered into the Agreement with the goal of ensuring police services are provided to the AV community in a manner which fully complies with the Constitution and the laws of the United States. The Department is responsible for implementing the mandated stipulations of the Agreement, ensuring both public and Department member safety, while fostering a renewed public trust in the LASD.

The AAB was authorized by the Sheriff of Los Angeles County, the US-DOJ, and the AV Monitoring Team (MT) to conduct audits of the Department. To improve efficiency and effectiveness, the AAB shifted its audit approach from conducting full-scale audits to limited scope audits. These limited scope audits, focus on a narrow set of audit objectives and specific audit populations, which are referred to by the AAB as “mini” audits. The purpose of the mini audits was intended to provide timely feedback to the AV Stations, facilitate opportunities for operational improvements, and demonstrate an increasing commitment toward meeting the established AV compliance metrics (compliance metrics).

² The GAGAS, also known as the Yellow Book, is issued by the Comptroller General of the United States through the U.S. Government Accountability Office and refers to *Government Auditing Standards*, July 2018 Revision, Technical Update April 2021.

OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

The Department recognizes the importance of evaluating Department members' actions when interacting with members of the public. Department members' interactions with the AV community are essential to developing and maintaining community trust. This audit provided an opportunity to identify areas for process improvement and implement corrective actions where necessary. An audit work plan was submitted to the MT and the US-DOJ for input prior to the start of the audit.

Audit Scope

The scope of this audit assessed stops and detentions, with a specific focus on the treatment of individuals who were searched based on consent. This included an evaluation of the Department members' knowledge of consent searches, the articulation of consent requests and response, and the proper articulation and documentation. The auditors also evaluated the reasonableness of consent searches for both persons and vehicles.

In addition, the auditors evaluated body-worn camera (BWC)³ activations, the completeness of BWC recordings, the proper documentation of stops and detentions involving consent searches, and whether the required advisements were provided to detained subject(s) throughout the interactions. Any deficiencies or deviations were identified and documented. Furthermore, patterns of legal or policy errors were identified and reported.

The MT and the Parties did not explicitly define a compliance metric for the use of BWC. However, the Department had established comprehensive policies specifically regulating the use of BWC. The compliance metrics for Objectives No. 1(a), 1(b), and 1(c) were set at 100%.

Audit Population and Sample

The selected audit period was from November 1, 2024, through December 31, 2024. The audit focused on a single population from which audit samples were extracted. This population included:

- Stops and detentions involving initiation of stops and detentions related to consent searches.

³ A BWC is a device worn by a Department member that allows an event to be recorded and saved as a digital file.

A data request was submitted through the Sheriffs Automated Contact Reporting (SACR)⁴ system, for all the AV Stations’ stops and detentions (vehicle, pedestrian, and bicycle stops). The resulting data yielded a population of 4,065 stops and detentions. The search criteria were refined by filtering the “Contact Reason,” “Basis for Search,” and “Narrative” fields for all consent search related markers, as they met the testing criteria for this audit.

Additionally, the filter “DEP” was used to eliminate calls for service. This selection process resulted in a refined population of 59 stops and detentions with a consent search.

Of the 59 stops, 31 were from Lancaster Station and 28 were from Palmdale Station. The auditors assessed the 59 initiated stops and detentions.

The SACR documentation was reconciled with the Computer-Aided Dispatch⁵ (CAD) system documentation, and discrepancies between the two systems were identified and addressed in the “Other Related Matters” section.

Audit Population and Sample

AV Stations	Stops and Detentions	Consent Searches
Lancaster	1,815	31
Palmdale	2,250	28
AV Total	4,065	59

Using a one-tailed statistical test with a 95% confidence level and a 4% error rate, the auditors selected a statistically valid random sample of stops and detention incidents for the audit period. Given the minimal size of the resulting population, the auditors evaluated the entire audit population as indicated.

⁴ The SACR is a stand-alone system and will run independently of the Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) system. The SACR is a data entry system designed to collect any detention by a peace officer of a person or any peace officer interaction with a person in which the peace officer conducts a search, including a consensual search, or arrest.

⁵ The CAD system is a multi-faceted computerized platform the Department utilizes to log, track, and document patrol-related incidents. It maintains electronic records of patrol activities, including dispatch-generated 911 calls, general “Calls for Service,” and patrol deputy-initiated “Observation” stop records. This technology enhances operational efficiency by facilitating real-time incident management and resource allocation.

Audit Procedures

The MT Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) published the “*Antelope Valley Monitoring Team First Stops and Bias-Free Policing Audit*,” report in 2024, which evaluated stops from the third quarter of 2021 and documented compliance metrics. During a meeting on April 2, 2025, the SMEs directed AAB to utilize those compliance metrics, noting they may differ from those used in previous AAB audit reports.

The auditors reviewed the BWC recordings for each stop and detention within the audit population. This included BWC recordings from the primary Department members involved in the application of the consent search, or those having direct contact with, the subject (e.g., driver, passengers, or individuals present at the scene) during the active investigatory stop or detention. The auditors assessed and reviewed approximately 104 BWC recordings from the audit population utilizing the Department’s digital evidence management system, LASD.Evidence.com. The associated BWC recordings were reviewed, to assess the Department’s compliance with the established compliance metrics and Department policies. The audit work demonstrated the auditors’ independence and objectivity in supporting the results and findings.

To verify the accuracy of the Department members’ documentation, the auditors reviewed BWC recordings and cross-referenced them with MDC data and SACR entries related to consent searches conducted by the AV Department members. The intent was to use both MDC and SACR as documentation sources, recognizing that one system contained the necessary data while the other did not. In such instances, the system that held the relevant information was relied upon as the documentation source for that audit sample. This approach reflected the reality that MDC and SACR served as complementary systems, and, at times, information appeared in one but not in the other. Relying on both systems ensured a complete and accurate review of documentation. This process did not involve evaluating the quality or usability of MDC or SACR systems themselves but acknowledged the need to rely on both systems due to their limitations.

The auditors provided recommendations or corrective actions when incorrect information related to consent searches was entered into the MDC data or SACR system during any stops or detentions. In instances when the auditors observed potential misconduct, not previously identified by station management, an interim audit memorandum detailing the incident was submitted to the North Patrol Division (NPD) for their review and disposition.

Summary of Findings

This audit consisted of two main objectives with a total of eight sub-objectives. The AV Stations were evaluated separately for each sub-objective. The results were combined to assess whether they complied with the compliance metrics.

The table below indicates the audit objectives and their corresponding compliance metrics percentage:

Summary of Compliance Metrics Findings

Obj. No.	Audit Objectives	Lancaster %	Palmdale %	AV Total	Compliance Metrics %
1	INITIATING STOPS AND DETENTIONS				
1(a)	<i>Proper Activation of Body Worn Camera</i>	84%	85%	84%	100%
1(b)	<i>Introduction and Stating Reason for stop</i>	71%	61%	66%	100%
1(c)	<i>Completeness of Recording</i>	92%	85%	98%	100%
2	CONSENT SEARCHES				
2(a)	<i>Consent Search Request and Response (Person Searches)</i>	89%	93%	92%	95%
2(b)	<i>Consent Search Reasonableness (Person Searches)</i>	95%	98%	97%	90%
2(c)	<i>Consent Search Request and Response (Vehicle Searches)</i>	100%	100%	100%	95%
2(d)	<i>Consent Search Reasonableness (Vehicle Searches)</i>	100%	100%	100%	90%
2(e)	<i>Consent Search of Individuals - Documentation and Articulation</i>	74%	57%	66%	95%

The AAB acknowledges the compliance metrics may be subject to change in the future. The auditors will adjust their methodology and criteria as necessary to align with any approved modifications agreed upon by all parties.

Detailed Findings

This report provides detailed information on the findings noted during the audit for all objectives.

Objective No. 1 – Initiating Stops and Detentions

This objective evaluated the initiation of stops and detentions by AV Department members as they related to the proper activation of the BWC recordings, the provision of required introductory information provided to detained subjects, and the completeness of BWC recordings, as specified in the Agreement, established compliance metrics, and Department policy.

Objective No. 1(a) – Proper Activation of Body Worn Camera

Criteria

Manual of Policy and Procedures, Section 3-06/200.08, Body Worn Cameras – Activation, (August 2020), states:

Department members shall activate their body worn camera (BWC) prior to initiating, or upon arrival at, any enforcement or investigative contact involving a member of the public, including all:

- *Vehicle stops*
- *Pedestrian stops (including self-initiated consensual encounters);*
- *Searches;*
- *Arrests;*
- *Any encounter with a member of the public who is or becomes uncooperative, belligerent, or otherwise hostile...*

Manual of Policy and Procedures, Section 3-06/200.58 - Guidelines for Administrative Reviews of Body Worn Camera Recordings, (August 2020), states:

90-Day Transition Period

During the first 90 days a member is assigned a BWC, following completion of training, unintentional deviations in policy and procedure in the use and deployment of a BWC will be considered training issues. During the transition period, Department employees should receive non-documented counseling and training only. Performance log entries should not be generated.

Per discussions with the MT, the compliance metric for this objective is 100%. The AAB conducted the evaluation based on the MPP sections cited above.

Procedures

The auditors examined 59 investigatory stops and detentions conducted by the AV Stations. Of these, 31 were from Lancaster Station and 28 were from Palmdale Station, involving 47 Department members from Lancaster Station and 40 Department members from Palmdale Station. The auditors reviewed each BWC recording within the audit population to determine whether Department members activated their BWC prior to initiating, or upon arrival at, any enforcement or investigative contact involving a member of the public.

Four late activations involved Department members in their first phase of patrol training. These four activations were excluded from this objective because, during the 90-day transition period, deviations from BWC policy are considered training issues, and Department members are not subject to documented performance log entries, as stated in MPP Section 3-06/200.58. One exclusion was from Palmdale Station, and three exclusions were from Lancaster.

As a result, auditors evaluated 83 BWC activations.

Findings

For the AV Stations combined, 70 (84%) of the 83 Department members evaluated met the criteria for this objective because Department members activated their BWC prior to initiating, or upon arrival at, any enforcement or investigative contact involving a member of the public. The remaining 13 (16%) did not meet the criteria for this objective, because the Department members were late in activating their BWC.

For Lancaster Station, 37 (84%) of the 44 Department members met the criteria for this objective because Department members activated their BWC prior to initiating, or upon arrival at, any enforcement or investigative contact involving a member of the public. The remaining seven (16%) Department members did not meet the criteria for this objective, because the Department members were late in activating their BWC.

For Palmdale Station, 33 (85%) of the 39 Department members met the criteria for this objective because Department members activated their BWC prior to initiating, or upon arrival at, any enforcement or investigative contact involving a member of the public. The remaining six (15%) Department members did not meet the criteria for this objective, because the Department members were late in activating their BWC.

Specifically:

L-1⁶: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for no front license plate. One Department member did not activate their BWC prior to or upon initiating contact, as required by policy.

L-3: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for tinted windows. The Department member did not activate their BWC prior to or upon initiating contact, as required by policy.

L-22: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for speeding. The Department member did not activate their BWC prior to or upon initiating contact with the subject, as required by policy.

L-25: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for an inoperable brake light. The Department member did not activate their BWC prior to or upon initiating contact, as required by policy.

L-28: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for vehicle dismantling in a motel parking lot. Neither Department members activate their BWC prior to or upon initiating contact, as required by policy. However, was within the 90-day transition period rule and was therefore excluded from this finding.

L-30: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for missing license plates on a truck and trailer. One Department member did not activate their BWC prior to or upon initiating contact, as required by policy.

L-31: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for a missing license plate. One Department member did not activate their BWC prior to or upon initiating contact, as required by policy.

P-1⁷: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a pedestrian stop for a trespassing investigation. Neither Department members activate their BWCs prior to or upon initiating contact, as required by policy.

P-18: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a traffic stop for a missing front license plate. Neither Department members activate their BWCs prior to or upon initiating contact, as required by policy.

⁶ L refers to Lancaster Station. The number represents the sample being referred to of those reviewed by Lancaster Station.

⁷ P refers to Palmdale Station. The number represents the sample being referred to of those reviewed by Palmdale Station.

P-27: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a pedestrian stop for public intoxication. The Department member did not activate their BWC prior to or upon initiating contact, as required by policy.

P-28: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a pedestrian stop for smoking cannabis in a public place. The Department member did not activate their BWC prior to or upon initiating contact, as required by policy.

Recommendations

It is recommended Department members receive training and briefings emphasizing the requirement to activate their BWC prior to exiting their patrol vehicles or initiating any enforcement or investigative contact with members of the public as mandated by MPP 3-06/200.08. Primary and secondary Department members should be reminded of their shared responsibility to activate BWCs promptly.

Additionally, supervisors should issue Performance Log Entries (PLEs) as informal counseling for first-time or minor lapses. For repeated or more serious violations, particularly those involving the loss of critical recordings, formal documentation or an administrative investigation should be initiated in accordance with Department policy.

Additionally, AV Stations should create a corrective action plan to address Department members who frequently fail to comply with the BWC policy. This must include addressing these violations through verbal counseling or appropriate written documentation as applicable.

Objective No. 1(b) – Introduction and Stating the Reason for the Stop

Criteria

There are no applicable compliance metrics for this objective; however, The Antelope Valley Settlement Agreement states in paragraph 42:

LASD agrees to incorporate the following elements in its training of Antelope Valley deputies: (1) introducing themselves at the initiation of contact with a civilian when reasonable and practicable ; (2) stating the reason for an investigatory stop or detention as soon as practicable; (3) ensuring that an investigatory stop or detention is no longer than necessary to take appropriate action; and (4) acting with professionalism and courtesy throughout the interaction.

The auditors also evaluated compliance as defined in California Assembly Bill (AB) 2773:⁸

...require a peace officer making a traffic or pedestrian stop, before engaging in questioning related to a criminal investigation or traffic violation, to state the reason for the stop, unless the officer reasonably believes that withholding the reason for the stop is necessary to protect life or property from imminent threat...

Per discussions with the MT, the compliance metric for this objective is 100%. The AAB conducted the evaluation based on the Agreement paragraph cited above and the requirements of AB 2773.

Procedures

The auditors reviewed each BWC recording in the audit population to assess whether Department members introduced themselves at the initiation of contact with a subject. The auditors also determined whether Department members stated the reason for the investigatory stop or detention to the subject when reasonable and practicable. In addition, the auditors evaluated the entirety of the investigation and BWC recordings to determine whether any incidents occurred outside of the regular investigation which impeded its progress, including the unnecessary detainment of the subject or a lack of professionalism and courtesy by the Department member.

In addition, the auditors evaluated each incident to determine if the Department member withheld the reason out of necessity to protect life or property from imminent threat. As such, the auditor determined these instances did not result in an audit finding.

⁸ Assembly Bill No. 2773- This bill began on January 1, 2024, and requires a peace officer making a traffic or pedestrian stop, before engaging in questioning related to a criminal investigation or traffic violation, to state the reason for the stop, unless the officer reasonably believes that withholding the reason for the stop is necessary to protect life or property from imminent threat.

Findings

For the AV Stations combined, 39 (66%) of the 59 stops and detentions met the criteria for this objective because Department members introduced themselves and stated the reason for the stop. The remaining 20 (34%) did not meet the criteria for this objective, because Department members failed to introduce themselves to the subject or failed to state the reason for the stop or detention.

For Lancaster Station, 22 (71%) of the 31 stops and detentions met the criteria for this objective because Department members introduced themselves and stated the reason for the stop. The remaining 9 (29%) stops did not meet the criteria for this objective because the Department members did not introduce themselves or state the reason for the stop.

For Palmdale Station, 17 (61%) of the 28 stops and detentions met the criteria for this objective because Department members introduced themselves and stated the reason for the stop. The remaining 11 (39%) stops did not meet the criteria for this objective because the Department members did not introduce themselves or state the reason for the stop.

Specifically:

L-3: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for tinted windows. Due to the late BWC activation, auditors were unable to determine if the Department member introduced himself at the initiation of the contact or advised the subject of the reason for the stop. Once the BWC was activated, the Department member was already engaged in questioning related to a criminal or traffic investigation.

L-12: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for a missing license plate. The Department member stated the reason for the contact, however due to the late BWC activation, auditors were unable to determine if he introduced himself.

L-14: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a pedestrian stop for loitering to commit a crime. The Department member did not introduce himself at the initiation of contact and did not state the reason for the stop before initiating questioning related to a criminal or traffic investigation.

L-19: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a traffic stop for driving under the influence. The Department member did not introduce himself at the initiation of contact and did not state the reason for the stop before initiating questioning related to a criminal or traffic investigation.

L-20: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for expired registration. The Department members did not introduce themselves at the initiation of contact, but they did provide the reason for the stop.

L-23: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for missing license plates. Due to the late BWC activation, auditors were unable to determine if the Department members introduced themselves at the initiation of the contact or advised the subject of the reason for the stop. Once the BWC was activated, the Department members were already engaged in questioning the subject related to a criminal or traffic investigation.

L-28: This stop involved a two-person unit contacting two subjects who were using a Motel parking lot to repair their vehicles. Due to the late BWC activation, auditors were unable to determine if the Department members introduced themselves at the initiation of the contact or advised the subjects of the reason for the stop. Once the BWC was activated, the Department members were already engaged in questioning the subjects related to a criminal or traffic investigation.

L-30: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for a missing rear license plate. Due to the late BWC activation, auditors were unable to determine if the Department members introduced themselves at the initiation of the contact or advised the subject of the reason for the stop. Once the BWC was activated, the Department members were already engaged in questioning the subject related to a criminal or traffic investigation.

L-31: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for a missing license plate. Due to the late BWC activation, auditors were unable to determine if the Department members introduced themselves at the initiation of the contact or advised the subject of the reason for the stop. Once the BWC was activated, the Department members were already engaged in questioning the subject related to a criminal or traffic investigation.

P-1: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a pedestrian stop for a trespassing investigation. Due to the late BWC activation auditors were unable to determine if the Department members introduced themselves at the initiation of the contact or advised the subject of the reason for the stop. Once the BWC was activated, the Department members were already engaged in questioning the subject related to a criminal or traffic investigation.

P-3: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for expired registration. The Department members stated the reason for the contact; however, they did not introduce themselves during the initiation of contact or as soon as practicable.

P-4: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for expired registration. The Department members did not provide an introduction or state the reason for the stop during the initiation of contact or as soon as practicable.

P-7: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for a missing license plate. The Department member did not provide an introduction and a reason for the stop during the initiation of contact or as soon as practicable..

P-9: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for expired registration. The Department member provided a reason for the stop, but did not provide an introduction during the initiation of contact or as soon as practicable.

P-15: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a bicycle stop for operating a bicycle against the flow of traffic. The Department members stated the reason for the stop but did not provide an introduction during the initiation of contact or as soon as practicable.

P-18: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for a missing license plate. The Department members provided a reason for the stop but did not introduce themselves during the initiation of contact or as soon as practicable.

P-20: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for a grand theft investigation. The Department member stated the reason for the stop but did not introduce himself during the initial contact or as soon as practicable.

P-24: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for suspicious persons. The Department members did not provide an introduction and a reason for the stop during the initiation of the contact or as soon as practicable.

P-27: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a pedestrian stop for being drunk in public. Due to the late BWC activation, auditors were unable to determine if the Department members introduced themselves at the initiation of the contact or advised the subject of the reason for the stop. Once the BWC was activated, the Department members were already engaged in questioning the subject related to a criminal or traffic investigation.

P-28: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for suspicious persons in a vehicle. Due to late BWC activation, auditors were unable to determine if the Department member introduced himself at the initiation of the contact or advised the subject of the reason for the stop. Once the BWC was activated, the Department member was already engaged in questioning the subject related to a criminal or traffic investigation.

Recommendations

During the review, auditors found low compliance percentages for this objective. Many findings exist due to late BWC activations; therefore, auditors were unable to determine compliance with the SA and AB 2773.

It is recommended Department supervisors regularly brief Department members on CA-AB 2773, as well as the terms of the Agreement, and document these briefings in the Station's Watch Commander's Log. During the Daily Stop Audits¹², Station supervisors must ensure the Department members are introducing themselves and stating the reason for the stop when it is reasonable or practicable to do so. If a stop or detention is dynamic at the initiation of a stop, it is important Department members provide the subjects with an introduction once the situation has de-escalated. Department members must also be reminded of the reason for the stop must be stated prior to engaging in questioning related to a criminal investigation or traffic violation. Department members who repeatedly fail to comply should be held accountable through verbal counseling and/or appropriate written documentation, as applicable.

Objective No. 1(c) – Completeness of Recordings

Criteria

Manual of Policy and Procedures, Section 3-06/200.13, Recording of the Entire Contact, (August 2020), states:

The body worn camera (BWC) shall continue recording until the enforcement or investigative contact involving a member of the public has ended. If an investigative or enforcement contact involving a member of the public resumes after the video has stopped, the Department member shall reactivate the BWC device and continue recording.

Per discussions with the MT, the compliance metric for this objective is 100%. The AAB conducted the evaluation based on the MPP section cited above.

Procedures

The auditors examined 59 investigatory stops and detentions conducted by the AV Stations, 31 from Lancaster Station and 28 from Palmdale Station, involving 47 Department members from Lancaster Station and 40 Department members from Palmdale Station.

The auditors reviewed each BWC recording within the audit population to determine whether Department members recorded the enforcement or investigative contact involving a member of the public until the contact ended. Additionally, if the enforcement or investigative contact resumed after the BWC recording had stopped, the auditors assessed whether the Department member reactivated the BWC as required by policy and continued recording.

Findings

For the AV Stations combined, 80 (92%) of the 87 Department members evaluated met the criteria for this objective because the Department members recorded the enforcement or investigative contact involving a member of the public until it ended. The remaining 7 (8%) Department members did not meet the criteria for this objective because the Department members did not record the enforcement or investigative contact until the contact ended.

For Lancaster Station, 46 (98%) of the 47 Department members met the criteria for this objective because Department members recorded the enforcement or investigative contact involving a member of the public until it ended. The remaining one (2%) Department members did not meet the criteria for this objective because the Department members did not record the enforcement or investigative contact until the contact ended.

For Palmdale Station, 34 (85%) of the 40 Department members met the criteria for this objective because Department members recorded the enforcement or investigative contact involving a member of the public until it ended. The remaining six (15%) Department members did not meet the criteria for this objective because the Department members did not record the enforcement or investigative contact until the contact ended.

Specifically:

L-10: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for expired registration. One Department member deactivated his BWC, without providing a reason, while the vehicle was still being searched and the subjects were still seated on the curb. The auditors determined the Department member did not continuously record the entire contact until the enforcement or investigative contact involving a member of the public had ended.

P-1: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a pedestrian stop for a trespassing investigation. One Department member deactivated his BWC, without providing a reason, prior to the subject signing the citation and being released. The auditors determined one Department member did not continuously record the entire contact until the enforcement or investigative contact involving a member of the public had ended.

P-7: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for expired registration. The Department member deactivated his BWC, without providing a reason, prior to the end of contact while the subject was still seated in the back seat of the patrol vehicle. The auditors determined the Department member did not continuously record the entire contact until the enforcement or investigative contact involving a member of the public had ended.

P-11: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for speeding. The Department members deactivated their BWCs as the subjects were retrieving their belongings from the patrol vehicle. The auditors determined the Department members did not continuously record the entire contact until the enforcement or investigative contact involving a member of the public had ended.

P-24: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for suspicious persons. Department members' BWC recordings illustrated three subjects sleeping inside a vehicle with narcotics in plain view. The Department members deactivated their BWCs, without providing a reason, while the subjects were still seated on the curb prior to their release. Based on BWC recordings, the auditors determined the Department members did not continuously record the entire contact until the enforcement or investigative contact involving a member of the public had ended.

P-25: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for failure to signal before turning/changing lanes. The Department member deactivated his BWC, without providing a reason, while one subject was seated at the curb and another subject was detained in the back seat of his patrol vehicle waiting for a citation. Based on BWC recording, the auditors determined the Department member did not continuously record the entire contact until the enforcement or investigative contact involving a member of the public had ended.

Recommendations

It is recommended Department members make a concerted effort to consistently keep their BWC activated during a stop or detention from beginning to end. AV Station Department members must be reminded to narrate the reason if they need to deactivate their BWC at any point during the stop or detention.

The AV Stations supervisors should continue conducting practical application exercises to ensure Department members understand the proper procedures for activating and de-activating their BWCs. Supervisors must also include training on the guidelines for BWC deactivations. The MPP 3-06/200.18 – Body Worn Camera Recording Exceptions clearly outlines the three exceptions when Department members are allowed to deactivate their cameras. Supervisors must instill the importance of transparency and emphasize how the completeness of BWC recordings help mitigate risk for both the Department members and the Department.

During the Daily Stop Audits, station supervisors must verify the completeness of Department members' BWC recordings. Department members who demonstrate a pattern of noncompliance must be held accountable through verbal counseling and/or appropriate written documentation, as applicable.

Objective No. 2 – Consent Searches

This objective included the evaluation of consent searches (person and vehicle searches) conducted by AV Department members as specified in the established compliance metrics and LASD policy. A consent search is defined as a search conducted by a law enforcement officer after obtaining voluntary and informed consent from an individual to search their person, property and/or belongings without a warrant.

Objective No. 2(a) – Consent Search Request and Response (Person Searches)

Criteria

The Antelope Valley Settlement Agreement Compliance Metrics, Stops, Seizures, and Searches, Paragraph 52.1 states:

LASD will be deemed in compliance with this provision when:

At least 95% of the time LASD-AV Department members equipped with body worn audio or video recorders record their requests for a consent search and the individual's response.

Procedures

The auditors evaluated 59 stops and detentions with a consent search for the AV Stations and identified 48 consent searches of persons. Of these 18 were from Lancaster Station and 30 from Palmdale Station. The auditors analyzed the MDC data entered by the Department members during their conducted stops or detentions. The information was verified by viewing all BWC recordings pertaining to consent searches (person), to determine whether Department members recorded their requests for a consent search and the subject's response. A consent search occurs when a subject voluntarily consents to being searched by deputy members.

Findings

For the AV Stations combined, 44 (92%) of the 48 consent searches of persons met the criteria for this objective because Department members recorded their requests for a consent search and the subject's response. The remaining four (8%) did not meet the criteria for this objective because Department members failed to record their requests on BWC recordings for a consent search and the subject's response.

For Lancaster Station, 16 (89%) of the 18 Department members met the criteria for this objective, because Department members recorded their request for a consent to search and the subject's response. The remaining two (11%) Department members did not meet the criteria for this objective, because they failed to record the request for a consent search and the subject's response.

For Palmdale Station, 28 (93%) of the 30 Department members met the criteria for this objective, because Department members recorded their request for a consent search and the subject's response on BWC recordings. The remaining two (7%) Department members did not meet the criteria for this objective, because they failed to record the request for a consent search and the subject's response.

Specifically:

L-24: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for no front license plate. The subject was ordered out of the vehicle and handcuffed. During a weapons pat-down search, the Department member manipulated the subject's right front pant pocket, entered the pocket, removed the contents and placed the item(s) on the subject's driver's seat. The Department member did not request or obtain consent prior to the search.

L-25: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for an inoperable brake light. The subject was ordered out of the vehicle, handcuffed and searched; the Department member reached into the subject's hoodie pocket, removed keys and a cell phone and placed it into the subject's vehicle. The Department member did not request or obtain consent prior to the search.

P-11: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a traffic stop for tinted windows. The driver was arrested for having a firearm on his person. The front subject passenger was ordered out of the vehicle and searched, without consent. The rear subject passenger was searched with consent. The Department member did not request or obtain consent prior to the search for the front subject passenger.

P-18: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for a missing license plate. The driver of the vehicle was outside his vehicle at a gas pump. A Department member asked the subject for consent to search but did not receive a response; the Department member conducted a search of the subject. The Department member did not obtain consent prior to the search.

Recommendations

It is recommended the AV Stations conduct recurrent briefings to reinforce when consent searches should be requested and how consent should be obtained. Furthermore, it is recommended the AV Stations continue to conduct the "Daily Stops Audits" review process of documented consent searches, wherein supervisors regularly inspect the recordings with the Department members to ensure adherence to search protocols, document constructive feedback, identify any pattern of deficiencies, and provide additional training details for cases of non-compliance.

Objective No. 2(b) – Consent Search Reasonableness (Person Searches)

Criteria

Antelope Valley Settlement Agreement Compliance Metrics, Stops, Seizures, and Searches, Paragraph 51 states:

LASD will be deemed in compliance with this provision when:

For at least 90% of consent searches, the request to conduct the search is reasonable and the deputy articulated a valid reason under the law and/or LASD policy for initially having stopped the individual.

Procedures

The auditors analyzed the MDC data entered by the Department members during their conducted stops or detentions in which a consent search of a person had occurred. The auditors verified this information by viewing all BWC recordings related to each incident classified as a consent search (person). This was done to determine if the consent searches of the subject were reasonable. In addition, the auditors evaluated each incident in which a subject was searched to determine whether, beyond the specified criteria, the totality of the circumstances justified the search.

The auditors determined the request to conduct a search to be reasonable if the search met the following:

- Conducted with sound judgment;
- Based on valid reasons, under the law or policy for the stop;
- It remained within the boundaries of what was consented; and
- It did not involve misconduct or persuasion by the Department member.

The auditors evaluated 59 investigatory stops and detentions with a consent search for the AV Stations and identified 101 subjects. Of these 88 subjects were identified as being searched, 43 for Lancaster Station, and 45 for Palmdale Station. As a result, 88 subjects were evaluated for this objective.

Findings

For the AV Stations combined, a total of 88 searches were reviewed. Of these, 85 (97%) subject searches met the criteria for this objective because the request to conduct the search was determined to be reasonable. The remaining three (3%) did not meet the criteria because the search was not determined to be objectively reasonable.

For Lancaster Station, 41 (95%) subject searches met the criteria for this objective because the request to conduct the search was determined to be reasonable. The remaining two (5%) did not meet the criteria for this objective because the reason for seeking consent for the search was not articulated in the MDC data, nor did the BWC recordings capture the justification for the search.

For Palmdale Station, 44 (98%) of subject searches met the criteria for this objective because the request to conduct the search was determined to be reasonable. The remaining one (2%) did not meet the criteria for this objective because the reason for seeking consent for the search was not articulated in the MDC data, nor did the BWC recordings capture the justification for the searches.

Specifically:

L-24: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for no front license plate. The Department member ordered the subject out of his vehicle and searched him without consent. During a weapons pat-down, a small item in the subject's front right pant pocket was manipulated and removed. The auditor's determined, by reviewing the BWC recording, the weapons pat-down search was conducted within the scope authorized, but the search of the subject's pocket without consent was not.

L-25: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for an inoperable brake light. The subject was ordered out of the vehicle, handcuffed and searched. The Department Member reached into the subject's hoodie pocket, removed keys and a cell phone and placed them in the subject's vehicle without consent. The auditors determined the weapons pat-down search was conducted within the scope authorized, but the search of the pockets without consent was not.

P-11: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a traffic stop for tinted windows. The Department members contacted the subject driver, who admitted to having a firearm on his person; he was subsequently arrested. The front subject passenger was ordered out of the vehicle and searched. A metal flashlight was removed from his jacket pocket, and he was subsequently handcuffed. The Department member continued to search the subject and removed trivial items from his pocket without consent. The rear subject passenger was searched with consent. The auditors determined the weapons pat-down and removal of flashlight was within the scope authorized but the rest of the search was not.

P-18: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for a missing license plate. The driver was outside his vehicle at a gas pump. A Department member asked the subject for consent to search but did not receive a response and proceeded to search the subject. Therefore, auditors determined the search was not consensual and therefore not reasonable.

Recommendations

It is recommended the AV Stations continue recurrent briefings regarding obtaining consent from a subject prior to searching them, if searched on the basis of consent. Discussions should also include other legal reasons to search a subject that does not require consent. The training must include active discussions regarding ensuring the BWC is activated to capture this consent in compliance with the Agreement. Furthermore, the AV Station supervisors must create corrective action plans for members who frequently fail to comply with the Agreement requirements regarding consent searches. This may include documenting these violations in a Performance Log Entry (PLE) or conducting an Administrative Investigation, if applicable.

Objective No. 2(c) – Consent Search Request and Response (Vehicle Searches)

Criteria

Antelope Valley Settlement Agreement Compliance Metrics, Stops, Seizures, and Searches, Paragraph 52.1 states:

LASD will be deemed in compliance with this provision when:

At least 95% of the time LASD-AV Department members equipped with body worn audio or video recorders record their requests for a consent search and the individual's response.

Procedures

The auditors evaluated 59 investigatory stops and detentions with a consent search for the AV Stations, and identified 26 consent searches of vehicles, 17 from Lancaster Station and nine from Palmdale Station.

The auditors analyzed the MDC data entered by the Department members during their stops or detentions and verified the information by viewing all BWC recordings related to each individual incident classified as a consent search (vehicle). This process determined whether Department members recorded their requests for a consent search and the subject's response.

Findings

For the AV Stations combined, all 26 (100%) consent searches of vehicles met the criteria for this objective because Department members requested consent to search the vehicle and recorded both the request and the subject's response.

For Lancaster Station, all 17 (100%) consent searches of vehicles met the criteria for this objective because Department members requested consent to search the vehicle and recorded both the request and the subject's response.

For Palmdale Station, all nine (100%) consent searches of vehicles met the criteria for this objective because Department members requested consent to search the vehicle and recorded both the request and the subject's response.

Recommendations

There are no recommendations because the AV Stations met the compliance requirements for this objective.

Objective No. 2(d) – Consent Search Reasonableness (Vehicle Searches)

Criteria

Antelope Valley Settlement Agreement Compliance Metrics, Stops, Seizures, and Searches, Paragraph 51 states:

LASD will be deemed in compliance with this provision when:

For at least 90% of consent searches, the request to conduct the search is reasonable and the deputy articulated a valid reason under the law and/or LASD policy for initially having stopped the individual.

Procedures

The auditors analyzed the MDC data entered by the Department members during their conducted stops or detentions in which a consent search of a vehicle had occurred. The auditors verified this information by viewing all BWC recordings related to each incident classified as a consent search (vehicle). This process was conducted to determine if the consent searches of the vehicle were reasonable. In addition, the auditors evaluated each incident in which a vehicle was searched to determine whether, beyond the specified criteria, the totality of the circumstances justified the consent search.

The auditors determined the request to conduct a search to be reasonable if the search met the following:

- Conducted with sound judgment;
- Based on valid reason(s), under the law or policy for the stop;
- It remained within the boundaries of what was consented, and;
- It did not involve misconduct or persuasion by the Department member.

The auditors evaluated 59 investigatory stops and detentions with a consent search for the AV Stations. Seven stops and detentions did not have a vehicle, two for Lancaster and five for Palmdale. In addition, five stops and detentions for Lancaster involved vehicles that were not searched. As a result, 47 stops and detentions, 24 for Lancaster and 23 for Palmdale, involved vehicles that were searched and evaluated for this objective.

Findings

For the AV Stations combined all 47 (100%) searches met the criteria for this objective because the request to conduct the search was determined to be reasonable.

For Lancaster Station, all 24 (100%) searches met the criteria for this objective because the request to conduct the search was determined to be reasonable.

For Palmdale Station, all 23 (100%) searches met the criteria for this objective because the request to conduct the search was determined to be reasonable.

Recommendations

There are no recommendations because the AV Stations met the compliance requirements for this objective.

Objective No. 2(e) – Consent Search of Persons/Vehicle – Documentation and Articulation

Criteria

Antelope Valley Settlement Agreement Compliance Metrics, Stops, Seizures, and Searches, Paragraph 44, Section 1, states:

LASD will be deemed in compliance with this provision when:

At least 95% of the time for each item below (measured independently), Department members document the following information about patrol activity in their MDC patrol logs.

44 (j) whether a consent search of an individual was conducted, and if so, the reason for seeking consent...

Per discussions with the MT on December 30, 2024, it was agreed upon that the AAB can utilize the SACR system, in addition to the Agreement, to audit the AV Stations. In accordance with the MT's discussions, Department members must also articulate the proper justification for the search in the SACR entry narrative.

Procedures

The auditors examined 59 investigatory stops and detentions for the AV Stations, consisting of 31 from Lancaster Station and 28 from Palmdale Station. The auditors reviewed the MDC data and SACR logs for each documented consent search of a subject and the corresponding BWC recordings. The focus was to assess whether Department members documented the occurrence of consent searches for drivers and passengers, as well as the reason for seeking consent. Furthermore, the auditors evaluated the consistency between the stated reason for seeking consent in the MDC data and the corresponding BWC recordings.

Findings

For the AV Stations combined, 39 consent searches of a subject (66%) met the criteria for this objective, because the consent search and the reason for seeking consent were documented in the MDC data or SACR. The remaining 20 (34%) did not meet the criteria for this objective because the consent search and the reason for seeking consent were not documented in the MDC data or SACR.

For Lancaster Station, 23 (74%) of the 31 consent searches of a subject met the criteria for this objective because the consent search and the reason for seeking consent were documented in the MDC data and SACR. The remaining eight (26%) consent searches of a subject did not meet the criteria for this objective, because the consent search and the reason for seeking consent were not documented in the MDC data and SACR.

For Palmdale Station, 16 (57%) of the 28 consent searches of a subject met the criteria for this objective because the consent search and the reason for seeking consent were documented in the MDC data. The remaining 12 (43%) consent searches of a subject did not meet the criteria for this objective because the consent search and the reason for seeking consent were not documented in the MDC data and SACR.

Specifically:

L-8: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for expired registration. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted the subject driver, who admitted to marijuana in the vehicle. The Department members also observed narcotics in plain view. The Department members conducted a weapons pat-down on the subject driver and a search of the vehicle. The search of the subject driver and the vehicle were documented as “C-Consent Search.” The search codes should have been documented as “E-Evidence of Criminal Activity” since consent was neither requested nor obtained. The incident did not meet the criteria because the Department members incorrectly documented the searches.

L-10: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for expired registration. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted two subjects and conducted a weapons pat-down of the subject driver and a consent search of the subject passenger. The search of the subject driver was documented as “C-Consent Search.” The search code should have been documented as “W-Weapons Patdown” since consent was neither requested nor obtained. The search code for the subject passenger was accurately documented. This incident did not meet the criteria because the Department members incorrectly documented the search.

L-11: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for window obstruction. A review of BWC recordings revealed the Department member contacted three subjects and conducted two consent searches and one search incident to arrest. The search of the subject driver and the rear subject passenger was documented as “W-Weapons Patdown.” The search code should have been documented as “C-Consent Search” since consent was requested and obtained. The search code for the front subject passenger was accurately documented as “A-Incident to Arrest.” This incident did not meet the criteria because the Department members incorrectly documented the search for two of the subjects.

L-12: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for a missing license plate. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department member contacted the subject driver who was not searched and obtained consent to search the vehicle. The search code of the vehicle was accurately documented as a “C-Consent Search”; however, the reason for seeking consent was not articulated. This incident did not meet the criteria because the reason for the consent search was not articulated and documented.

L-23: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for missing license plates. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted four subjects and conducted two weapons pat-downs and two consent searches. The Department members documented the front subject passenger and the left rear subject passenger as “W-Weapons Patdown.” The searches should have been documented as “C-Consent Search” since consent was requested and obtained. The search codes for the subject driver and the right rear subject passenger were accurately documented as “W-Weapons PatDown.” This incident did not meet the criteria because the Department member incorrectly documented the search for two of the subjects.

L-24: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for a missing front license plate. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department member contacted the subject driver and conducted a search which included removing items from the subject’s pocket without consent. The search was documented as “W-Weapons Patdown.” The search code should have been documented as X-Other, with the reason for conducting the search. This incident did not meet the criteria because the Department member incorrectly documented the search.

L-28: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a pedestrian stop for a vehicle being dismantled at a late hour. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted two subjects who were utilizing a motel parking lot to repair a vehicle. One subject was not searched nor documented. The subject should have been documented as “N-Not Searched.” The second subject was accurately documented as “N-Not Searched.” This incident did not meet the criteria because the Department members did not document one subject.

L-31: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for a missing license plate. A review of the BWC recording revealed the Department members contacted three subjects. The subject driver admitted to possessing narcotics paraphernalia. The Department members conducted one evidence search and two incident to arrest searches. The search of the subject driver was documented as “W-Weapons Patdown”, however he should have been documented as “E-Evidence of Criminal Activity”. The two subject passengers were accurately documented as “A-Incident to Arrest.” This incident did not meet the criteria because the Department members incorrectly documented the search for one subject.

P-3: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for expired registration. A review of the BWC recording revealed the Department members contacted two subjects and obtained consent to conduct a search of the subject driver. The subject passenger search code was documented as “C-Consent Search”, however, the search code should have been documented as “N-Not Searched” since the subject was not searched. The search of the subject driver was accurately documented as “C-Consent Search.” This incident did not meet the criteria because the Department member incorrectly documented the search for the passenger.

P-4: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for expired registration. A review of the BWC recording revealed the Department members contacted the subject driver and observed open containers of alcoholic beverages in the vehicle. The Department members conducted a consent search of the subject driver and also searched the vehicle; however, the vehicle search was not documented. The search of the subject driver was accurately documented as “C-Consent Search.” The search code of the vehicle should have been documented as “E-Evidence of Criminal Activity”. This incident did not meet the criteria because the Department members did not document the vehicle search.

P-7: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for a missing license plate. A review of the BWC recording revealed the Department member contacted the subject driver and conducted a consent search. The search code was documented as “C-Consent Search”; however, the reason for seeking consent was not provided. The incident did not meet the criteria because the reason for the consent search was not articulated and documented.

P-9: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for expired registration. A review of the BWC recording revealed the Department member contacted the subject driver who admitted to narcotic paraphernalia in the vehicle. The Department member conducted an evidence search of the subject driver. The search was documented as “C-Consent Search”, however, the search code should have been documented as “E-Evidence Search” since consent was not requested nor obtained. In addition, the vehicle search was documented as “C-Consent Search.” The vehicle search code should have been documented as “E-Evidence of Criminal Activity.” This incident did not meet the criteria because the Department member incorrectly documented the search of the subject driver and of the vehicle.

P-10: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for speeding. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted two subjects and conducted searches of both. The subject passenger admitted to having narcotics paraphernalia prior to being searched. The search was documented as a “W-Weapons Patdown”, however, the search code should have been documented as “E-Evidence of Criminal Activity.” The search of the subject driver was accurately documented as “C-Consent Search.” This incident did not meet the criteria because the Department members incorrectly documented the search.

P-11: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for window obstruction and unsafe speed while driving. A review of BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted three subjects in the vehicle. The subject driver admitted to having a firearm in his possession, and a weapons pat-down was conducted. The front subject passenger was searched without consent, and the rear subject passenger was searched with consent. All three searches were documented as “W-Weapons Patdown.” The search code of the front subject passenger should have been documented as “X-Other” with the reason for conducting the search. The rear subject passenger should have been documented as C-Consent Search since consent was requested and obtained. The search code of the subject driver was accurately documented in the MDC data as “W-Weapons Patdown.” This incident did not meet the criteria because the Department members incorrectly documented two of the three searches.

P-13: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for expired registration and license plate violations. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted two subjects and obtained consent to search. The search for the subject passenger was documented as “W-Weapons Patdown.” The search code should have been documented as “C-Consent Search” since consent was requested and obtained. The search of the subject driver was accurately documented as “C-Consent.” This incident did not meet the criteria because the Department member incorrectly documented the search.

P-18: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for a missing license plate. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted the subject driver standing outside his vehicle. The Department members conducted a search of the subject driver, and the search was documented as “C-Consent Search”. The search code should have been documented as “X-Other” with a reason for conducting the search since consent was requested but not obtained. This incident did not meet the criteria because the Department member incorrectly documented the search.

P-19: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for expired registration and window obstruction. A review of BWC recordings revealed the Department member contacted four subjects in a vehicle who all admitted to possession of marijuana. The Department members conducted a search of each subject and the vehicle. The search of the subject driver was documented as “N-Not Searched”, however the search code should have been documented as “E-Evidence of Criminal Activity”. The search of the front subject passenger was documented as “W- Weapons Patdown”, however, the search code should have been documented as “E-Evidence of Criminal Activity”. The search codes of the rear subject passengers were accurately documented as “C-Consent Search” since consent was requested and obtained.

In addition, the Department members documented the vehicle search as “N-Not Searched.” The search code should have been documented as “E-Evidence of Criminal Activity” since the vehicle was searched after the occupants admitted to possession of marijuana. This incident did not meet the criteria because the Department members incorrectly documented the search codes for two of the four subjects and the vehicle.

P-22: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for expired registration. A review of BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted three subjects in the vehicle and observed an open container of marijuana and the odor of burnt marijuana. The Department members conducted consent searches of the subjects. The search of the rear subject passenger was documented as “C-Consent Search” however, the search code should have been documented as “E-Evidence of Criminal Activity” since consent was neither requested nor obtained. The search code of the subject driver and front subject passenger were accurately documented as “C-Consent Search” since consent was requested and obtained.

In addition, the Department members documented the vehicle search as “C-Consent Search” however, the search code should have been documented as “E-Evidence of Criminal Activity” since the Department members observed an open container of marijuana and the odor of burnt marijuana inside the vehicle. This incident did not meet the criteria because the Department member incorrectly documented the search code for one of the three subjects and the vehicle.

P-24: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for suspicious persons. A review of BWC recordings revealed the Department member contacted three subjects in a vehicle and observed narcotics paraphernalia in plain view. The Department members conducted searches of the subjects and vehicle. The search of the subject driver was documented as “W-Weapons Patdown”, however, the search should have been documented as “C-Consent” since consent was requested and obtained. The rear subject passenger was searched but not documented. The search code should have been documented as “E-Evidence of Criminal Activity”. The search code of the front subject passenger was accurately documented as “W-Weapons Patdown.”

In addition, the Department members documented the vehicle search as “C-Consent Search.” The search code should have been documented as “E-Evidence of Criminal Activity” since narcotics paraphernalia was in plain view. This incident did not meet the criteria because the Department members did not document one of the subjects and incorrectly documented the vehicle search.

P-28: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for suspicious persons in a vehicle. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department member contacted four subjects in a vehicle and detected the odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle. The Department member conducted a search the subjects. The search code of the front and left rear subject passengers were documented as “W-Weapons Patdown”, however, the search codes should have been documented as “O-Odor of Contraband”. The right rear subject passenger was not searched and was not documented; the subject search code should have been documented as “N-Not Searched”. The search code of the subject driver was accurately documented as “W-Weapons Patdown.” The vehicle search code was accurately documented as “C-Consent Search.” This incident did not meet the criteria because the Department member incorrectly documented three of the four subjects.

Recommendations

To improve compliance, it is recommended to implement a training program which emphasizes the importance of accurate documentation in consent searches. Prioritize clear and consistent documentation in the MDC data clearance and SACR logs, including providing detailed reasons for seeking consent while also recording this interaction on the employee’s BWC. Additionally, as previously stated, it is recommended the Department develop a BWC recording review process of documented consent searches, wherein supervisors regularly inspect the recordings with the Department members to ensure adherence to search protocols, document constructive feedback and provide additional training details for cases of non-compliance.

CONCLUSION

The AAB considers the findings of this Stops and Detentions audit to be a helpful management tool for the AV Stations. The continued efforts of the AV Stations have been largely successful in their attempts to comply with the terms of the SA and must remain diligent. The AAB recognized the positive strategies employed by the AV supervisors, which impacted station Department members and encouraged them to continue providing the necessary guidance to ultimately meet compliance with the SA.

In some instances, there appeared to be a lack of awareness among AV Department members pertaining to the appropriate procedures for requesting consent to search, the standard of reasonableness, and proper documentation of the search. In addition, the observed de-activations of the BWC mid-way through an investigative and enforcement contact not only limit oversight in determining if Agreement provisions were adhered to, but more importantly, increase the risk of allegations, unlawful activities, and the loss of valuable evidence.

The evidence gathered during this audit strongly suggests the AV Station Department members must remain mindful of the room for improvement particularly with respect to compliance with Department policies, the stipulations set forth in the Agreement, and established compliance metrics.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this section is to provide a concise reference for all recommendations aimed at improving compliance with the Agreement and Department policies and procedures. The recommendations listed below are the same as those detailed in the above report.

Objective No. 1 – Initiating Stops and Detentions

(a) Proper Activation of Body-Worn Camera

It is recommended Department members receive training and briefings emphasizing the requirement to activate their BWC prior to exiting their patrol vehicles or initiating any enforcement or investigative contact with members of the public as mandated by MPP 3-06/200.08. Primary and secondary Department members should be reminded of their shared responsibility to activate BWCs promptly.

Additionally, supervisors should issue Performance Log Entries (PLEs) as informal counseling for first-time or minor lapses. For repeated or more serious violations, particularly those involving the loss of critical recordings, formal documentation or an administrative investigation should be initiated in accordance with Department policy.

Additionally, AV Stations should create a corrective action plan to address Department members who frequently fail to comply with the BWC policy. This must include addressing these violations through verbal counseling or appropriate written documentation as applicable.

(b) Introduction and Stating the Reason for the Stop

During the review, auditors found low compliance percentages for this objective. Many findings exist due to late BWC activations; therefore, auditors were unable to determine compliance with the SA and AB 2773.

It is recommended Department supervisors regularly brief Department members on CA-AB 2773, as well as the terms of the Agreement, and document these briefings in the Station's Watch Commander's Log. During the Daily Stop Audits¹², Station supervisors must ensure the Department members are introducing themselves and stating the reason for the stop when it is reasonable or practicable to do so. If a stop or detention is dynamic at the initiation of a stop, it is important Department members provide the subjects with an introduction once the situation has de-escalated. Department members must also be reminded of the reason for the stop must be stated prior to engaging in questioning related to a criminal investigation or traffic violation. Department members who repeatedly fail to comply should be held accountable through verbal counseling and/or appropriate written documentation, as applicable.

(c) Completeness of BWC Recordings

It is recommended Department members make a concerted effort to consistently keep their BWC activated during a stop or detention from beginning to end. AV Station Department members must be reminded to narrate the reason if they need to de-activate their BWC at any point during the stop or detention.

The AV Stations supervisors should continue conducting practical application exercises to ensure Department members understand the proper procedures for activating and de-activating their BWCs. Supervisors must also include training on the guidelines for BWC deactivations. The MPP 3-06/200.18 – Body Worn Camera Recording Exceptions clearly outlines the three exceptions when Department members are allowed to de-activate their cameras. Supervisors must instill the importance of transparency and emphasize how the completeness of BWC recordings help mitigate risk for both the Department members and the Department.

During the Daily Stop Audits, station supervisors must verify the completeness of Department members' BWC recordings. Department members who demonstrate a pattern of noncompliance must be held accountable through verbal counseling and/or appropriate written documentation, as applicable.

Objective No. 2 – Consent Searches

(a) – Consent Search Request and Response (Person Searches)

It is recommended the AV Stations conduct recurrent briefings to reinforce when consent searches should be requested and how consent should be obtained. Furthermore, it is recommended the AV Stations continue to conduct the "Daily Stops Audits" review process of documented consent searches, wherein supervisors regularly inspect the recordings with the Department members to ensure adherence to search protocols, document constructive feedback, identify any pattern of deficiencies, and provide additional training details for cases of non-compliance.

(b) – Consent Search Reasonableness (Person Searches)

It is recommended the AV Stations continue recurrent briefings regarding obtaining consent from a subject prior to searching them, if searched on the basis of consent. Discussions should also include other legal reasons to search a subject that does not require consent. The training must include active discussions regarding ensuring the BWC is activated to capture this consent in compliance with the Agreement. Furthermore, the AV Station supervisors must create corrective action plans for members who frequently fail to comply with the Agreement requirements regarding consent searches. This may include documenting these violations in a Performance Log Entry (PLE) or conducting an Administrative Investigation, if applicable.

(e) – Consent Search of Persons/Vehicle- Articulation and Documentation

To improve compliance, it is recommended to implement a training program which emphasizes the importance of accurate documentation in consent searches. Prioritize clear and consistent documentation in the MDC data clearance and SACR logs, including providing detailed reasons for seeking consent while also recording this interaction on the employee’s BWC. Additionally, as previously stated, it is recommended the Department develop a BWC recording review process of documented consent searches, wherein supervisors regularly inspect the recordings with the Department members to ensure adherence to search protocols, document constructive feedback and provide additional training details for cases of non-compliance.

FOLLOW-UP PROCEDURES

The AAB will conduct a follow-up of the recommendations and verify if the auditee has made necessary improvements. Verification of corrective action will be assessed by examining new directives, amended unit orders, and/or relevant documentation. The AAB will work with the auditee in understanding the implementation of audit recommendations, as it may be a lengthy process and require a collaborative effort with other Department resources.

DEPARTMENT APPLICATIONS

- Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) System Services
- LASD.Evidence.com
- Mobile Digital Computer (MDC) log
- RAPSNET

REFERENCES


- Antelope Valley Settlement Agreement Compliance Metrics (October 2019)
- United States Department of Justice – Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department Antelope Valley Settlement Agreement, Case Number CV 15-03174 (April 2015)
- Antelope Valley Settlement Agreement, Case Number CV 15-03174 (April 2015)
- California Assembly Bill 2773 (2024)
- Manual of Policy and Procedures Sections:
 - MPP 3-01/000.05 (2023)
 - MPP 5-09/520.05 (2017)

PART IV OF STOPS AND DETENTIONS AUDIT
INITIATION OF STOPS AND DETENTIONS – RELATED TO CONSENT SEARCHES
ANTELOPE VALLEY STATIONS

PROJECT NO. 2025-7-A

Views of Responsible Officials

On August 5, 2025, the AAB submitted a summary of findings to the AV Station command staff. The AAB presented the final audit report to the Division Director, Office of Constitutional Policing.



12/15/2025

GEOFFREY N. CHADWICK

DATE

Captain

Audit and Accountability Bureau

Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department