



ROBERT G. LUNA, SHERIFF

LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT

Part IV of Stops and Detentions Audit:

Initiation of Stops and Detentions Related to
Consent Searches

Antelope Valley Stations

Project No. 2025-17-A

Prepared By:

Audit and Accountability Bureau



2025

**Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department
Audit and Accountability Bureau**

**Part IV of Stops and Detentions Audit:
Initiation of Stops and Detentions - Consent Searches
Antelope Valley Stations
Project No. 2025-17-A**

AUDIT REPORT

PURPOSE

The Audit and Accountability Bureau (AAB) conducted the Stops and Detentions Audit under the authority of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD or the Department), pursuant to the United States Department of Justice (US-DOJ) Antelope Valley (AV) Settlement Agreement (Agreement)¹ Paragraph 149, which states:

The Monitor shall... determine whether LASD has implemented and continues to comply with the material requirements of this Agreement... Where appropriate, the monitor will make use of audits conducted by the [Audit and Accountability Bureau] taking into account the importance of internal auditing capacity and independent assessment of this agreement.

This Stops and Detentions Audit was conducted in five separate audits (Parts I, II, III, IV, and V) to provide timely feedback to Lancaster and Palmdale Stations (AV Stations). Each of the five audits addresses the requirements of the Agreement.

This audit, designated as Part IV, specifically focused on assessing initiated stops and detentions, along with consent searches related to the AV Stations' compliance with paragraphs 42, 44, 51, and 52 of the Agreement.

The Stops and Detentions Audits were conducted in the following manner:

Part	Audit
I	Backseat Detentions
II	Supervisory Review of Deputy's Daily Worksheet
III	Backseat Detentions Related to Domestic Violence
IV	Initiation of Stops and Detentions Related to Consent Searches
V	Initiation of Stops and Detentions Related to Probation or Parole Searches

¹ [Antelope Valley Settlement Agreement. No. CV 15-03174, United States v. Los Angeles County et al. \(D.C. Cal. April 28, 2015\)](#)

This audit is scheduled to be recurring. The table below lists the project numbers, due dates, and population time periods, which are subject to change.

Project Numbers, Due Dates, and Population Time Periods

Project No.	Projected Due Date	Population Time Period
2025-7-A	April 30, 2025	November 1, 2024, to December 31, 2024
2025-17-A	October 31, 2025	May 1, 2025, to June 30, 2025

The AAB conducted this audit under the guidance of Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS)². The AAB determined whether the evidence obtained was sufficient and appropriate to provide a reasonable basis for the findings based on the audit objectives.

BACKGROUND

On April 28, 2015, the County of Los Angeles, the Department, and the US-DOJ entered into the Agreement with the goal of ensuring police services are provided to the AV community in a manner which fully complies with the Constitution and the laws of the United States. The Department is responsible for implementing the mandated stipulations of the Agreement, ensuring both public and Department member safety, while fostering a renewed public trust in the LASD.

The AAB was authorized by the Sheriff of Los Angeles County, the US-DOJ, and the AV Monitoring Team (MT) to conduct audits of the Department. To improve efficiency and effectiveness, the AAB shifted its audit approach from conducting full-scale audits to limited scope audits. These limited scope audits focus on a narrow set of audit objectives and specific audit populations. The purpose of the limited scope audits was intended to provide timely feedback to the AV Stations, facilitate opportunities for operational improvements, and demonstrate an increasing commitment toward meeting the established AV Compliance Metrics (compliance metrics).

OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

The Department recognizes the importance of evaluating Department members' actions when interacting with members of the public. Department members' interactions with the AV community are essential to developing and maintaining community trust. This audit provided an opportunity to identify areas for process improvement and implement corrective actions where necessary. An audit work plan was submitted to the MT and the US-DOJ for input prior to the start of the audit.

Audit Scope

The scope of this audit evaluated stops and detentions, with a specific focus on the treatment of individuals who were searched based on their consent. This included evaluating Department members' knowledge and application of consent search procedures. The auditors also assessed whether Department members properly articulated consent requests and responses, and whether the searches were reasonable, lawful, and properly documented. The auditors also evaluated the reasonableness of consent searches for both subjects and vehicles.

In addition, the auditors evaluated body-worn camera (BWC)² activations, the completeness of BWC recordings, the proper documentation of stops and detentions involving consent searches, and whether the required advisements were provided to detained subject(s) throughout the interactions. Any deficiencies or deviations were identified and documented. Furthermore, patterns of legal or policy errors were identified and reported.

The MT and the Parties did not explicitly define a compliance metric for the use of BWC. However, the Department has established comprehensive policies specifically regulating the use of BWC. The compliance metrics for Objectives No. 1(a), 1(b), and 1(c) were set at 100%.

Audit Population

The selected audit period was from May 1, 2025, through June 30, 2025. The audit focused on a single population from which audit samples were extracted. This population included:

- Stops and detentions involving consent searches.

A data request was submitted to Data Systems Bureau (DSB), for all the AV Stations' stops and detentions (vehicle, pedestrian, and bicycle stops) with consent search data during the audit period. The resulting data yielded a total population of 3,253 stops and detentions: 997 from Lancaster Station and 2,256 from Palmdale Station. The search criteria "Consent Search" was then applied, as it met the testing criteria for this audit.

This selection process resulted in a refined population of 132 stops and detentions involving a consent search. Using a one-tailed test with a 95% confidence level and 4% error rate, auditors selected a statistically valid random sample of 57 stops and detentions involving a consent search for the audit period. From this, auditors applied a stratified, randomly selected sample of 26 from Lancaster and 31 from Palmdale Stations involving a consent search.

² A BWC is a device worn by a Department member that allows an event to be recorded and saved as a digital file.

The auditors assessed the 57 initiated stops and detentions involving consent searches to verify whether the objectives were met by reviewing each primary Department members’ BWC recording, Sheriff’s Automated Contact Reporting (SACR)⁴³ data entries, and associated Deputy Daily Work Sheet (DDWS). The table below summarizes the number of stops and detentions relevant to this audit from the Mobile Digital Computer (MDC)⁴ .

Audit Population and Sample

AV Station	Total Number of Stops and Detentions	Consent Searches	Sampled Population
Lancaster	997	60	26
Palmdale	2,256	72	31
AV Total	3,253	132	57

Audit Procedures

The MT Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) published the “*Antelope Valley Monitoring Team First Stops and Bias-Free Policing Audit*,” report in 2024, which evaluated stops from the third quarter of 2021 and documented compliance metrics. During a meeting on April 2, 2025, the SMEs directed AAB to utilize those compliance metrics, noting they may differ from those used in previous AAB audit reports.

The auditors reviewed the BWC recordings for each stop and detention within the audit population. This included BWC recordings from the primary Department members involved in the application of the consent search, or those having direct contact with the subject (e.g., driver, passengers, or individuals present at the scene) during the active stop and detention. The auditors assessed and reviewed approximately 97 BWC recordings from the audit population utilizing the Department’s digital evidence management system, LASD.Evidence.com. The associated BWC recordings were reviewed to assess the Department’s compliance with the established compliance metrics and Department policies. The audit work demonstrated the auditors’ independence and objectivity in supporting the results and findings.

³ The SACR is a stand-alone system and will run independently of the Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) system. The SACR is a data entry system designed to collect any detention by a peace officer of a person or any peace officer interaction with a person in which the peace officer conducts a search, including a consensual search, or arrest.

⁴ The MDC is a computer system installed in patrol vehicles, enabling Department members to access Department databases, communicate with dispatch, and perform operational tasks in the field.

To verify the accuracy of the Department members' documentation, the auditors reviewed BWC recordings and cross-referenced them with MDC log entries and SACR data entries related to consent searches conducted by the AV Department members. The intent was to use both MDC and SACR as documentation sources, recognizing that one system contained the necessary data while the other did not. In such instances, the system that held the relevant information was relied upon as the documentation source for that audit sample.

This approach reflected the reality that MDC and SACR served as complementary systems, and, at times, information appeared in one but not in the other. Relying on both systems ensured a complete and accurate review of documentation. This process did not involve evaluating the quality or usability of MDC or SACR systems themselves, but acknowledged the need to rely on both systems due to their limitations.

The auditors provided recommendations or corrective actions when incorrect information related to probation or parole searches was entered into the MDC or SACR system during any stops and detentions. In instances when the auditors observed potential misconduct, not already identified by station management, an interim audit memorandum detailing the incident was submitted to their respective unit commanders for review and disposition.

Summary of Findings

This audit consisted of two main objectives with a total of eight sub-objectives. The AV Stations were evaluated separately for each sub-objective. The results were combined to assess whether, overall, AV Stations met the compliance metrics. The table below outlines the audit objectives and their corresponding compliance metric percentages:

Summary of Compliance Metrics Findings

Obj. No.	Audit Objectives	Lancaster %	Palmdale %	AV Total ⁵	Compliance Metrics %
1	INITIATING STOPS AND DETENTIONS				
1(a)	<i>Proper Activation of Body Worn Camera</i>	74%	92%	85%	100%
1(b)	<i>Introduction and Stating Reason for Stop</i>	65%	68%	67%	100%
1(c)	<i>Completeness of Recording</i>	94%	88%	91%	100%
2	CONSENT SEARCHES				
2(a)	<i>Consent Search Request and Response (Person Searches)</i>	77%	93%	85%	95%
2(b)	<i>Consent Search Reasonableness (Person Searches)</i>	97%	100%	99%	90%
2(c)	<i>Consent Search Request and Response (Vehicle Searches)</i>	95%	89%	92%	95%
2(d)	<i>Consent Search Reasonableness (Vehicle Searches)</i>	96%	95%	96%	90%
2(e)	<i>Consent Search of Individuals - Documentation and Articulation</i>	42%	35%	39%	95%

The AAB acknowledges the compliance metrics may be subject to change in the future. The auditors will adjust their methodology and criteria as necessary to align with any approved modifications agreed upon by all parties.

⁵ The AV total compliance percentages were calculated according to the specific audit objectives, which may have involved reviewing incidents, Department members, or the number of subjects. Each audit objective outlines how the compliance percentages were determined based on the corresponding audit findings.

Detailed Findings

This report provides detailed information on the findings noted during the audit for all objectives.

Objective No. 1 – Initiating Stops and Detentions

This objective evaluated the initiation of stops and detentions by AV Department members as they related to the proper activation of the BWC recordings, the provision of required introductory information provided to detained subjects, and the completeness of BWC recordings, as specified in the Agreement, established compliance metrics, and Department policy.

Objective No. 1(a) – Proper Activation of Body-Worn Camera

Criteria

Manual of Policy and Procedures (MPP), Section 3-06/200.08, Body Worn Cameras – Activation, (August 2020), states in part:

Department personnel shall activate their body worn camera (BWC) prior to initiating, or upon arrival at, any enforcement or investigative contact involving a member of the public, including all:

- *Vehicle stops;*
- *Pedestrian stops (including self-initiated consensual encounters);...*
- *Searches;*
- *Arrests;...*
- *Any encounter with a member of the public who is or becomes uncooperative, belligerent, or otherwise hostile...*

Manual of Policy and Procedures, Section 3-06/200.58 - Guidelines for Administrative Reviews of Body Worn Camera Recordings, (August 2020), states:

90-Day Transition Period

During the first 90 days a member is assigned a BWC, following completion of training, unintentional deviations in policy and procedure in the use and deployment of a BWC will be considered training issues. During the transition period, Department employees should receive non-documented counseling and training only. Performance log entries should not be generated.

Manual of Policy and Procedures, Section 3-06/200.05 – Body Worn Cameras-Equipment, (August 2020), states:

Department personnel trained and issued a BWC device are required to wear and use their BWC while on duty, consistent with the terms of this policy. The on-duty watch commander or incident commander may grant exceptions for wearing a BWC to personnel who are working outside overtime assignments, special operations, or due to shortage of replacement cameras.

Per discussions with the MT, the compliance metric for this objective is **100%**. The AAB conducted the evaluation based on the MPP sections cited above.

Procedures

The auditors examined 57 stops and detentions conducted by the AV Stations. Of these, 26 were from Lancaster Station and 31 were from Palmdale Station, involving 37 Department members from Lancaster Station and 54 Department members from Palmdale Station. The auditors reviewed each BWC recording within the audit population to determine whether Department members activated their BWC prior to initiating, or upon arrival at, any enforcement or investigative contact involving a member of the public.

Three uniformed Department members assigned to custody participated in a ride-along. These three Department members were excluded from this objective because they were not trained and issued a BWC device, as stated in MPP Section 3-06/200.05. One excluded Department member was from Lancaster station, and the remaining two were from Palmdale station.

Three late activations involved Department members in their first phase of patrol training. These three activations were excluded from this objective because, during the 90-day transition period, deviations from BWC policy are considered training issues, and Department members are not subject to documented performance log entries, as stated in MPP Section 3-06/200.58. One exclusion was from Lancaster Station, and the remaining two exclusions were from Palmdale Station.

As a result, auditors evaluated 85 Department members' BWC activations.

Findings

For the AV Stations combined, 72 (84%) of the 85 Department members evaluated met the criteria for this objective because Department members activated their BWC prior to initiating, or upon arrival at, any enforcement or investigative contact involving a member of the public. The remaining 13 (16%) did not meet the criteria for this objective because the Department members were late in activating their BWC.

For Lancaster Station, 26 (74%) of the 35 Department members met the criteria for this objective because Department members activated their BWC prior to initiating, or upon arrival at, any enforcement or investigative contact involving a member of the public. The remaining nine (26%) Department members did not meet the criteria for this objective because the Department members were late in activating their BWC..

For Palmdale Station, 46 (92%) of the 50 Department members met the criteria for this objective because Department members activated their BWC prior to initiating, or upon arrival at, any enforcement or investigative contact involving a member of the public. The remaining four (8%) Department members did not meet the criteria for this objective, because the Department members were late in activating their BWC.

Specifically:

L-1 , L-3 , L-8, L-9, L-19, L-23, and L-24: Nine Department members did not meet the criteria for this objective because they did not activate their BWC prior to or upon initiating contact, as required by policy.

P-5, P-8, P-23 : Four Department members did not meet the criteria for this objective because they did not activate their BWC prior to or upon initiating contact, as required by policy.

Recommendations

It is recommended Department members receive training and briefings emphasizing the requirement to activate their BWC prior to exiting their patrol vehicles or initiating any enforcement or investigative contact with members of the public, as mandated by MPP Section 3-06/200.08. Primary and secondary Department members should be reminded of their shared responsibility to activate BWCs promptly.

Additionally, supervisors should issue Performance Log Entries (PLEs) as informal counseling for first-time or minor lapses. For repeated or more serious violations, particularly those involving the failure to capture critical recordings, formal documentation or an administrative investigation should be initiated in accordance with Department policy.

Furthermore, AV Stations should create a formal corrective action plan to address Department members who frequently fail to comply with the BWC policy. This must include addressing these violations through verbal counseling or appropriate written documentation as applicable.

Objective No. 1(b) – Introduction and Stating the Reason for the Stop

Criteria

There are no applicable compliance metrics for this objective; however, the Antelope Valley Settlement Agreement states in paragraph 42:

LASD agrees to incorporate the following elements in its training of Antelope Valley deputies: (1) introducing themselves at the initiation of contact with a civilian when reasonable and practicable ; (2) stating the reason for an investigatory stop or detention as soon as practicable; (3) ensuring that an investigatory stop or detention is no longer than necessary to take appropriate action; and (4) acting with professionalism and courtesy throughout the interaction.

The auditors also evaluated compliance as defined in California Assembly Bill (AB) 2773⁶ which:

...requires a peace officer making a traffic or pedestrian stop, before engaging in questioning related to a criminal investigation or traffic violation, to state the reason for the stop, unless the officer reasonably believes that withholding the reason for the stop is necessary to protect life or property from imminent threat...

Per discussions with the MT, the compliance metric for this objective is **100%**. The AAB conducted the evaluation based on paragraph 42 of the Agreement cited above and the requirements of AB 2773.

Procedures

The auditors examined 57 stops and detentions conducted by the AV Stations, 31 from Lancaster Station and 26 from Palmdale Station.

The auditors reviewed each BWC recording within the audit population to assess whether Department members introduced themselves at the initiation of contact with a subject when reasonable and practical. The auditors also determined whether Department members stated the reason for the stop and detention as soon as practicable.

⁶ Assembly Bill No. 2773- This bill began on January 1, 2024, and requires a peace officer making a traffic or pedestrian stop, before engaging in questioning related to a criminal investigation or traffic violation, to state the reason for the stop, unless the officer reasonably believes that withholding the reason for the stop is necessary to protect life or property from imminent threat.

In addition, the auditors also evaluated the entirety of each investigation and corresponding BWC recordings to determine whether any incidents occurred outside of the regular investigation which impeded its progress, including the unnecessary detainment of the subject or lack of professionalism and courtesy by the Department member.

Lastly,, the auditors evaluated each incident to determine whether the Department member withheld the reason for the stop out of necessity to protect life or property from an imminent threat. Such incidents, the auditor determined these instances did not result in an audit finding.

Findings

For the AV Stations combined, 38 (67%) of the 57 stops and detentions met the criteria for this objective because Department members introduced themselves and stated the reason for the stop. The remaining 19 (33%) did not meet the criteria for this objective, because Department members failed to introduce themselves to the subject or failed to state the reason for the stop and detention.

For Lancaster Station, 17 (65%) of the 26 stops and detentions met the criteria for this objective because Department members introduced themselves and stated the reason for the stop. The remaining nine (35%) stops did not meet the criteria for this objective. In these incidents, Department members did not introduce themselves at the initiation of contact, and in two cases, they also failed to state the reason for the stop and detention.

For Palmdale Station, 21 (68%) of the 31 stops and detentions met the criteria for this objective because Department members introduced themselves and stated the reason for the stop. The remaining 10 (32%) stops did not meet the criteria for this objective. In these incidents, Department members did not introduce themselves at the initiation of contact, and in five cases, they also failed to state the reason for the stop and detention.

Specifically:

L-1, L-19, L-24: Due to late BWC activation, auditors were unable to determine if the Department members made an introduction or stated the reason for the stop .

L-2, L-5, L-11, L-14: The Department members stated the reason for the stop; however, an introduction was not made by the Department member.

L-3: Due to late BWC activation, auditors were unable to determine if the Department members made an introduction or stated the reason for the stop.

L-8: The Department members neither introduced themselves nor stated the reason for the stop to the subject.

P-1, P-3, P-15, P-16, P-21: Due to late BWC activation, auditors were unable to determine if the Department members made an introduction or stated the reason for the stop.

P-5, P-8, P-23: Due to late BWC activation, auditors were unable to determine if the Department members made an introduction or stated the reason for the stop.

P-19, P-20: The Department members neither introduced themselves nor stated the reason for the stop to the subject.

Recommendations

During the review, auditors found low compliance percentages for this objective. Many findings exist due to late BWC activations; therefore, auditors were unable to determine compliance with Agreement and AB 2773.

It is recommended Department supervisors regularly brief Department members on CA-AB 2773, as well as the terms of the Agreement, and document these briefings in the Station's Watch Commander's Log. During the Daily Stop Audits¹², Station supervisors must ensure the Department members are introducing themselves and stating the reason for the stop when it is reasonable or practicable to do so. If a stop and detention is dynamic at the initiation of a stop, it is important Department members provide the subjects with an introduction once the situation has de-escalated. Department members must also be reminded of the reason for the stop must be stated prior to engaging in questioning related to a criminal investigation or traffic violation. Department members who repeatedly fail to comply should be held accountable through verbal counseling and/or appropriate written documentation, as applicable.

Objective No. 1(c) – Completeness of Recordings

Criteria

Manual of Policy and Procedures, Section 3-06/200.13, Recording of the Entire Contact, (August 2020), states:

The body worn camera (BWC) shall continue recording until the enforcement or investigative contact involving a member of the public has ended. If an investigative or enforcement contact involving a member of the public resumes after the video has stopped, the Department member shall reactivate the BWC device and continue recording.

Per discussions with the MT, the compliance metric for this objective is **100%**. The AAB conducted the evaluation based on the MPP section cited above.

Procedures

The auditors examined 57 stops and detentions conducted by the AV Stations, 31 from Lancaster Station and 26 from Palmdale Station, involving 35 Department members from Lancaster Station and 50 Department members from Palmdale Station.

The auditors reviewed each BWC recording within the audit population to determine whether Department members recorded the enforcement or investigative contact involving a member of the public until the contact ended. Additionally, if the enforcement or investigative contact resumed after the BWC recording had stopped, the auditors assessed whether the Department member reactivated the BWC as required by policy and continued recording.

Findings

For the AV Stations combined, 77 (91%) of the 85 Department members evaluated met the criteria for this objective because the Department members recorded the enforcement or investigative contact involving a member of the public until it ended. The remaining 8 (9%) Department members did not meet the criteria for this objective because the Department members did not record the enforcement or investigative contact until the contact ended.

For Lancaster Station, 33 (94%) of the 35 Department members met the criteria for this objective because Department members recorded the enforcement or investigative contact involving a member of the public until it ended. The remaining two (6%) Department members did not meet the criteria for this objective because the Department members did not record the enforcement or investigative contact until the contact ended.

For Palmdale Station, 44 (88%) of the 50 Department members met the criteria for this objective because Department members recorded the enforcement or investigative contact involving a member of the public until it ended. The remaining six (12%) Department members did not meet the criteria for this objective because the Department members did not record the enforcement or investigative contact until the contact ended.

Specifically:

L-11, L-18: Two Department members deactivated their BWCs prior to the conclusion of the enforcement or investigative contact and without an appropriate reason, per policy for going off camera. The Department members did not record the entire contact as required.

P-3, P-4, P-8, P-14: Six Department members deactivated their BWCs prior to the conclusion of the enforcement or investigative contact and, therefore, did not record the entire contact as required.

Recommendations

It is recommended Department members make a concerted effort to keep their BWCs activated continuously throughout the entire enforcement or investigative contact. AV Station Department members must be reminded to clearly narrate the reason if they must de-activate their BWC at any point during the stop and detention.

The AV Stations supervisors should continue conducting practical application exercises to ensure Department members understand the proper procedures for activating and de-activating their BWCs. Supervisors must also reinforce training on the guidelines for BWC deactivations. The MPP Section 3-06/200.18 – Body Worn Camera Recording Exceptions clearly outlines the three exceptions in which Department members are allowed to deactivate their cameras. Supervisors must instill the importance of transparency and emphasize that maintaining complete BWC recordings helps mitigate risk for both the Department members and the Department.

During the Daily Stop Audits, station supervisors must verify the completeness of Department members' BWC recordings. Department members who demonstrate a pattern of noncompliance must be held accountable through verbal counseling and/or written performance documentation, as applicable.

Objective No. 2 – Consent Searches

This objective included the evaluation of consent searches (person and vehicle searches) conducted by AV Department members as specified in the established compliance metrics and LASD policy. A consent search is defined as a search conducted by a law enforcement officer after obtaining voluntary and informed consent from an individual to search their person, property and/or belongings without a warrant.

Objective No. 2(a) – Consent Search Request and Response (Person Searches)

Criteria

The Antelope Valley Settlement Agreement Compliance Metrics, Stops, Seizures, and Searches, Paragraph 52.1 states:

LASD will be deemed in compliance with this provision when:

At least 95% of the time LASD-AV Department members equipped with body worn audio or video recorders record their requests for a consent search and the individual's response.

Procedures

The auditors evaluated 57 stops and detentions which involved a consent search for the AV Stations and identified 43 consent searches of persons. Of these 13 were from Lancaster Station and 30 from Palmdale Station.

The auditors analyzed the MDC data entered by the Department members during their conducted stops and detentions and verified the information by reviewing all corresponding BWC recordings. The review focused on determining whether Department members recorded both their requests for a consent search and the subject's response. A consent search occurs when a subject voluntarily consents to being searched by deputy members.

Findings

For the AV Stations combined, 38 (88%) of the 43 consent searches of persons met the criteria for this objective because Department members recorded their requests for a consent search and the subject's response. The remaining 5 (12%) did not meet the criteria for this objective because Department members failed to record either the request for a consent search, the subject's response, or both, on their BWC recordings.

For Lancaster Station, ten (77%) of the 13 Department members met the criteria for this objective, because Department members recorded both the request for a consent search and the subject's response. The remaining three (33%) Department members did not meet the criteria for this objective, because they failed to record the request for a consent search and/or the subject's response.

For Palmdale Station, 28 (93%) of the 30 Department members met the criteria for this objective, because Department members recorded both the request for a consent search and the subject's response on BWC recordings. The remaining two (7%) Department members did not meet the criteria for this objective, because they failed to record the request for a consent search and/or the subject's response.

Specifically:

L-1, L-15 : Three Department members classified their searches in the MDC narratives as "Weapons Patdowns. However, upon review of the BWC recordings, auditors observed the Department members removed items from the subjects' pocket(s) without requesting or obtaining consent.

P-17: One Department member classified the search as a "Consent Search" in the MDC narrative. However, upon review of the BWC recording, auditors observed the Department member did not request or obtain consent prior to conducting the search.

P-23: One Department member classified the search as a "Consent Search" in the MDC narrative. Due to late activation of the BWC, the auditors were unable to determine whether the Department member requested and obtained consent to search the subject.

Recommendations

It is recommended the AV Stations conduct recurrent briefings to reinforce when consent searches should be requested and how consent should be obtained. Furthermore, it is recommended the AV Stations continue to conduct the "Daily Stops Audits" review process of documented consent searches, wherein supervisors regularly review the BWC recordings with the Department members to ensure adherence to search protocols, provide constructive feedback, identify any pattern of deficiencies, and provide additional training for cases of non-compliance.

Objective No. 2(b) – Consent Search Reasonableness (Person Searches)

Criteria

Antelope Valley Settlement Agreement Compliance Metrics, Stops, Seizures, and Searches, Paragraph 51 states:

LASD will be deemed in compliance with this provision when:

For at least 90% of consent searches, the request to conduct the search is reasonable and the deputy articulated a valid reason under the law and/or LASD policy for initially having stopped the individual.

Procedures

The auditors analyzed the MDC data entered by the Department members during their conducted stops and detentions in which a consent search of a person occurred. The auditors verified this information by reviewing all BWC recordings related to each incident classified as a consent search (person). The review was conducted to determine whether each consent search of the subject was reasonable. In addition, the auditors evaluated each incident in which a subject was searched to determine whether, beyond the specified criteria, the totality of the circumstances justified the search.

The auditors determined the request to conduct a search to be reasonable if the search met the following:

- Conducted with sound judgment;
- Based on valid reasons, under the law or LASD policy for the stop;
- It remained within the boundaries of what was consented; and
- It did not involve misconduct or persuasion by the Department member.

The auditors evaluated 57 stops and detentions involving consent searches for the AV Stations and identified 85 subjects. Of these, 79 subjects were identified as being searched, 39 for Lancaster Station, and 40 for Palmdale Station. As a result, 79 subjects were evaluated for this objective.

Findings

For the AV Stations combined, 78 (99%) of the 79 subject searches met the criteria for this objective because the request to conduct the search was determined to be reasonable. The remaining one (1%) did not meet the criteria because the search was not determined to be objectively reasonable.

For Lancaster Station, 38 (97%) of the 39 subject searches met the criteria for this objective because the request to conduct the search was determined to be reasonable. The remaining one (3%) did not meet the criteria for this objective.

For Palmdale Station, all 40 (100%) subject searches met the criteria for this objective because the request to conduct the search was determined to be reasonable.

Specifically:

L-19: One Department member conducted a welfare check and obtained consent to search the subject. However, the auditors found no documented justification in the MDC log, SACR log, or on BWC to justify conducting the search.

Recommendations

There are no recommendations because the AV Stations met the compliance requirements for this objective.

Objective No. 2(c) – Consent Search Request and Response (Vehicle Searches)

Criteria

Antelope Valley Settlement Agreement Compliance Metrics, Stops, Seizures, and Searches, Paragraph 52.1 states:

LASD will be deemed in compliance with this provision when:

At least 95% of the time LASD-AV Department members equipped with body worn audio or video recorders record their requests for a consent search and the individual's response.

Procedures

The auditors evaluated 57 stops and detentions involving a consent search for the AV Stations, and identified 38 consent searches of vehicles, 20 from Lancaster Station and 18 from Palmdale Station.

The auditors analyzed the MDC data entered by the Department members during their stops and detentions and verified the information by viewing all corresponding BWC recordings related to each incident classified as a consent search (vehicle). This process was conducted to determine whether Department members recorded both their requests for a consent search and the subject's response. SACR data was not evaluated in this section because SACR does not include a specific section for vehicle search.

Findings

For the AV Stations combined, 35 (92%) of the 38 consent searches of vehicles met the criteria for this objective because Department members requested consent to search the vehicle and recorded both the request and the subject's response. The remaining three (8%) did not meet the criteria for this objective because Department members did not request and obtain consent prior to conducting the search of the vehicle.

For Lancaster Station, 19 (95%) of the 20 consent searches of vehicles met the criteria for this objective because Department members requested consent to search the vehicle and recorded both the request and the subject's response. The remaining (5%) consent search did not meet the criteria for this objective because Department members did not request and obtain consent prior to conducting the search of the vehicle.

For Palmdale Station, 16 (89%) of the 18 consent searches of vehicles met the criteria for this objective because Department members requested consent to search the vehicle and recorded both the request and the subject's response. The remaining two (11%) did not meet the criteria for this objective because Department members did not request and obtain consent prior to conducting the search of the vehicle.

Specifically:

L-22: The search was classified as a "Consent Search" per the MDC log. However, upon review of the BWC recording, auditors observed the Department member did not request or obtain consent prior to conducting the search of the vehicle.

P-14: The search was classified as a "Consent Search" in the MDC log. However, the Department members deactivated their BWCs during the contact, and auditors were unable to determine whether consent to search the vehicle was requested or obtained.

P-18: The search was classified as a "Consent Search" per the MDC log. However, upon review of the BWC recording, auditors observed the Department member did not request or obtain consent prior to conducting the search of the vehicle.

Recommendations

It is recommended that AV Stations reinforce the requirement for Department members to request and obtain explicit consent prior to conducting any vehicle search and ensure BWCs remain activated to capture the request and the subject's response. Routine training and shift briefings should emphasize these requirements and include a review of relevant BWC recordings to promote accountability and compliance.

Additionally, the training should reinforce the need for accurate data entry in MDC logs to ensure proper documentation of consent searches. It is also recommended that the SACR system include a designated section for entries documenting vehicle consent searches to promote consistency and oversight.

Furthermore, supervisors should continue to review BWC recordings during the Daily Stops Audit process and address repeated noncompliance through verbal counseling, Performance Log Entries (PLEs), or Administrative Investigations, as applicable.

Objective No. 2(d) – Consent Search Reasonableness (Vehicle Searches)

Criteria

Antelope Valley Settlement Agreement Compliance Metrics, Stops, Seizures, and Searches, Paragraph 51 states:

LASD will be deemed in compliance with this provision when:

*For at least **90%** of consent searches, the request to conduct the search is reasonable and the deputy articulated a valid reason under the law and/or LASD policy for initially having stopped the individual.*

Procedures

The auditors analyzed the MDC data entered by the Department members during their conducted stops and detentions in which a consent search of a vehicle had occurred. The auditors verified this information by reviewing all corresponding BWC recordings related to each incident classified as a consent search (vehicle). This process was conducted to determine whether the consent searches of the vehicle were reasonable.

In addition, the auditors evaluated each incident in which a vehicle was searched to determine whether, beyond the specified criteria, the totality of the circumstances justified the consent search.

The auditors determined the request to conduct a search to be reasonable if the search met the following:

- Conducted with sound judgment;
- Based on valid reason(s), under the law or policy for the stop;
- It remained within the boundaries of what was consented, and;
- It did not involve misconduct or persuasion by the Department member.

The auditors evaluated 57 stops and detentions with a consent search for the AV Stations. In Palmdale, eight stops and detentions did not involve a vehicle, and one involved a vehicle that was not searched. In Lancaster, two stops and detentions involved vehicles that were not searched.. As a result, 46 stops and detentions, 24 for Lancaster and 22 for Palmdale, involved vehicles that were searched and evaluated for this objective.

Findings

For the AV Stations combined 44 (98%) of the 46 searches met the criteria for this objective because the request to conduct the search was determined to be reasonable. The remaining one (2%) did not meet the criteria for this objective because the search was not determined to be objectively reasonable.

For Lancaster Station, 23 (96%) of the 24 searches met the criteria for this objective because the request to conduct the search was determined to be reasonable. The remaining one (4%) did not meet the criteria of this objective.

For Palmdale Station, 21 (95%) of the 22 searches met the criteria for this objective because the request to conduct the search was determined to be reasonable.

Specifically:

L-19: One Department member conducted a welfare check of a subject in his vehicle. The subject was determined to be unhoused and was resting in his vehicle. The subject was cooperative, provided his identification. The Department member obtained consent to search the vehicle. However, the auditors found no documented justification in the MDC log, SACR log, or on BWC to justify conducting the search.

P-14: The search was classified as a “Consent Search” in the MDC log. However, the Department members deactivated their BWCs during the contact, and auditors were unable to determine the reasonableness of the search.

Recommendations

There are no recommendations because the AV Stations met the compliance requirements for this objective.

Objective No. 2(e) – Consent Search of Persons/Vehicle – Documentation and Articulation

Criteria

Antelope Valley Settlement Agreement Compliance Metrics, Stops, Seizures, and Searches, Paragraph 44, Section 1, states:

LASD will be deemed in compliance with this provision when:

At least 95% of the time for each item below (measured independently), Department members document the following information about patrol activity in their MDC patrol logs.

44 (j) whether a consent search of an individual was conducted, and if so, the reason for seeking consent...

Per discussions with the MT on December 30, 2024, it was agreed that the AAB can utilize the SACR system, in addition to the Agreement, to audit the AV Stations. In accordance with the MT's discussions, Department members must also articulate the proper justification for the search in the SACR entry narrative.

Procedures

The auditors examined 57 stops and detentions for the AV Stations, consisting of 31 from Lancaster Station and 26 from Palmdale Station. The auditors reviewed the MDC data, SACR entries and the corresponding BWC recordings for each documented consent search of a subject. The review focused on whether Department members documented the occurrence of consent searches for drivers and passengers, and documented the reason for seeking consent. Furthermore, the auditors evaluated the consistency between the stated reason for seeking consent in the MDC or SACR data and what was captured on the corresponding BWC recordings.

Findings

For the AV Stations combined, 22 (39%) of the 57 consent searches of a subject met the criteria for this objective, because both the consent search and the reason for seeking consent were documented in the MDC or SACR. The remaining 35 (61%) did not meet the criteria for this objective because the consent search and/or the reason for seeking consent were not documented in the MDC or SACR.

For Lancaster Station, 11 (42%) of the 26 consent searches of a subject met the criteria for this objective because both the consent search and the reason for seeking consent were documented in the MDC and/or SACR. The remaining 15 (58%) consent searches of a subject did not meet the criteria for this objective because Department members incorrectly documented the searches (subject and/or vehicle), failed to document all subjects, and/or failed to document the reason for the consent searches.

For Palmdale Station, 11 (35%) of the 31 consent searches of a subject met the criteria for this objective because both the consent search and the reason for seeking consent were documented in the MDC and/or SACR. The remaining 20 (65%) consent searches of a subject did not meet the criteria for this objective because Department members incorrectly documented the searches (subject and/or vehicle), failed to document all subjects, and/or failed to document the reason for the consent searches.

Specifically:

L-1: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for swerving while driving. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted both subjects and searched their pockets, removing items without consent. The Department members documented the search authority codes of both subjects as “W-Weapons Patdown.” Since a consent search did not occur, the search codes should have been documented as “X-Other,” with the reason for conducting the search provided in the narrative.

L-3: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for expired registration. A review of BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted two subjects and conducted a weapons pat-down of both. The Department members accurately documented the search authority code for the subject driver as “W-Weapons Patdown.” However, the subject passenger was not documented in the DDWS log. The search code should have been documented as “W-Weapons Patdown” for the subject passenger.

L-4: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for failure to maintain license plate lamp. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department member contacted two subjects and conducted a consent search of the subject driver and a weapons pat-down of the subject passenger. The Department member accurately documented the search authority code for the subject driver as “C-Consent.” However, the Department member did not document the reason for seeking consent. The Department member also did not document the search of the subject passenger occurred. The search code should have been documented as “W-Weapons Patdown” for the subject passenger.

L-7: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for a missing license plate. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department member contacted two subjects and conducted a weapons pat-down of the subject driver. The subject passenger was not searched. The Department member accurately documented the search authority code for the subject driver as “W-Weapons Patdown.” However, the subject passenger was not documented. The search code should have been documented as “W-Weapons Patdown” for the subject passenger.

L-8: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for expired registration. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted the subject driver and conducted a consent search. The Department members documented the search authority code as “C-Consent Search.” However, they did not provide a reason for seeking consent in the narrative.

L-9: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for stopping past the limit line. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department member contacted the subject driver who admitted to smoking marijuana in the vehicle. A search of the subject was conducted. The Department member documented the search authority code as “W-Weapons Patdown.” The search code should have been documented as “O-Odor of Contraband.”

L-11: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a pedestrian stop for failure to signal prior to turn. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department member contacted two subjects and conducted a search of the subject driver incident to arrest and a consent search of the subject passenger. The Department member accurately documented the search authority code for the subject driver as “I-Incident to Arrest.” However, the subject passenger was not documented in the DDWS log. The search code should have been documented as “C-Consent Search.”

L-12: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for expired registration. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted one subject and conducted a weapons pat-down. The Department members documented the search authority code as “C-Consent Search.” However, consent was not requested or obtained. The search code should have been documented as “W-Weapons Patdown.”

L-15: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for speeding while driving. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department member contacted two subjects. The Department member conducted a search of the subject driver, entered the subject’s pockets, and removed items without consent. A weapons patdown of the subject passenger was also conducted. The Department member documented the search authority code for the subject driver and passenger as “W-Weapons Patdown.” Since a consent search did not occur for the subject driver, the search code should have been documented as “X-Other” with the reason for conducting the search in the narrative. The subject passenger was accurately documented.

L-17: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for failure to properly signal prior to making a turn. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted two subjects who admitted to smoking marijuana in the vehicle, observed the odor of burnt marijuana, and conducted a weapons patdown search of both subjects and a search of the vehicle. The Department members accurately documented the search authority codes as “W-Weapons Patdown” For the subjects. However, documented the vehicle search authority code as “N-Not Searched.” Since the vehicle was searched due to odor of contraband, the Department members should have documented the search code as “O-Odor of Contraband or “E-Evidence of Criminal Activity.”

L-19: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a welfare check. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted one subject and conducted a consent search of the subject and vehicle. The Department members accurately documented the search authority code for the subject as “C-Consent Search.” However, the vehicle was documented as “N-Not Searched.” The search code should have been documented as “C-Consent Search” for the vehicle because consent was requested and obtained.

L-20: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for expired registration. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department member contacted one subject and conducted a consent search of the subject and vehicle. The Department member accurately documented the search authority codes for the subject and vehicle as “C-Consent Search.” However, did not provide a reason for seeking consent in the narrative.

L-21: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for speeding while driving. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department member contacted one subject, observed the odor of burnt marijuana, and conducted a consent search of the subject driver and evidence search of the vehicle. The Department member documented the search authority code for the subject as “W-Weapons Patdown.” The search code should have been documented as “C-Consent Search” for the subject. The Department member documented the vehicle’s search authority code as “C-Consent Search.” However, consent was not requested or obtained. The search code should have been documented as “O-Odor of Contraband” or “E-Evidence of Criminal Activity” for the vehicle.

L-22: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for expired registration. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted three subjects, conducted a weapons patdown search of each subject, and searched the vehicle. The Department members accurately documented the search authority code for the subject driver as “W-Weapons Patdown.” However, they did not document the searches of the two passengers. The search codes should have been documented as “W-Weapons Patdown.” The Department members documented the vehicle’s search authority code as “C-Consent Search.” However, they did not request or obtain consent. The search code for the vehicle should have been documented as “X-Other” with the reason for conducting the search in the narrative.

L-26: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for a cracked missing back license plate and cracked windshield. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted one subject, conducted a search of the subject due to observed narcotics, and a consent search of the vehicle. The Department members documented the search authority code for the subject as “W-Weapons Patdown.” The search code should have been documented as “E-Evidence of Criminal Activity.” The Department members accurately documented the vehicle’s search authority code as “C-Consent Search.” However, they did not document the reason for conducting the search.

P-3: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for expired registration. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted one subject and conducted a consent search of the subject and vehicle. The Department members accurately documented the search authority code of the subject and vehicle as “C-Consent Search.” However, the Department members did not provide a reason for seeking consent in the narrative.

P-4: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for expired registration. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department member contacted one subject and conducted a consent search of the subject and vehicle. The Department member accurately documented the search authority codes of the subject and vehicle as “C-Consent Search.” However, the Department members did not provide a reason for seeking consent in the narrative.

P-6: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a pedestrian stop for a possible narcotics “hand to hand” transaction. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted two subjects and conducted a consent search of the one subject. The second subject was not searched. The Department members accurately documented the search authority code of one subject as “C-Consent Search” and the reason for seeking consent was documented in the narrative. However, the Department members did not document the second subject in the DDWS log.

P-7: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for speeding. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted the subject who had a crowbar on their person and conducted a weapons pat-down. The subject had a warrant for burglary and was later cited and released in the field. The vehicle was searched without consent. The Department member documented the vehicle search authority as “C-Consent Search.” Since a consent search did not occur, the search code should have been documented as “X-Other” with the reason for conducting the search in the narrative.

P-8: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a pedestrian stop for illegal use of a shopping cart. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department member contacted one subject and conducted a consent search of the subject. The Department member accurately documented the search authority code for the subject as “C-Consent Search.” However, the Department member did not provide a reason for seeking consent in the narrative.

P-9: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for no license plates on vehicle. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted one subject and conducted a consent search of the subject and vehicle. The Department members accurately documented the search authority codes for the subject and vehicle as “C-Consent Search.” However, the Department members did not provide a reason for seeking consent in the narrative.

P-10: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for expired registration. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted one subject and conducted a consent search of the subject and vehicle. The Department members accurately documented the search authority codes for the subject and vehicle as “C-Consent Search.” However, the Department members did not provide a reason for seeking consent to search the vehicle in the narrative.

P-12: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for running a red light. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department member contacted one subject and conducted a consent search of the subject and vehicle. The Department member accurately documented the search authority codes for the subject and vehicle as “C-Consent Search.” However, the Department member did not provide a reason for seeking consent to search the vehicle in the narrative.

P-13: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for a stolen license plate. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted one subject and conducted a consent search of the subject and vehicle. The Department members accurately documented the search authority codes for the subject and vehicle as “C-Consent Search.” However, the Department members did not provide a reason for seeking consent to search the vehicle in the narrative.

P-14: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for an unsafe lane change. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted five subjects and conducted a weapons pat-down of the subject driver and consent searches for the passengers. The Department members documented the search authority code for all subjects as “C-Consent Search.” However the search code should have been documented as “W-Weapons Patdown” since consent was not requested or obtained from the subject driver. The Department members documented the search authority code of the vehicle as “C-Consent Search,” however the auditors were unable to determine the type of search conducted because the BWCs were deactivated prior to the completion of the incident.

P15: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a pedestrian stop for walking in the roadway. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department member contacted one subject and conducted a consent search. The Department member accurately documented the search authority code for the subject as “C-Consent Search.” However, the Department member did not provide a reason for seeking consent in the narrative.

P-17: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for a warrant associated with the license plate. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted one subject and conducted a search, entered the subject’s pockets, and removed items without consent. The Department members documented the search authority code for the subject as “C-Consent Search.” since a consent search did not occur the search code should have been documented as “X-Other” with the reason for conducting the search in the narrative.

P-18: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for no front license plate. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted two subjects in a vehicle. The Department members conducted a weapons pat-down of the subject driver and did not search the subject passenger. The Department members documented the search authority code of the subject driver as “C-Consent Search.” The search code should have been documented as “W-Weapons Patdown.” The Department members accurately documented the search authority code of the subject passenger as “N-Not Searched.”

P-19: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a bicycle stop for an equipment violation. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department member contacted one subject, who admitted to a narcotics paraphernalia, and conducted a search. of the subject. The Department member documented the search authority code for the subject as “C-Consent Search.” However, the Department member did not request or obtain consent. The search should have been documented as “E-Evidence.”

P-22: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for failure to signal prior to turn and removal of license plate reflective coating. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted one subject and conducted a consent search of the subject and vehicle. The Department members accurately documented the search authority codes for the subject and vehicle as “C-Consent Search.” However, the Department members did not provide a reason for seeking consent in the narrative.

P-23: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for missing license plates. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted one subject and conducted a search. The Department members documented the search authority code for the subject as “C-Consent Search.” However the auditors were unable to determine the type of search conducted due to a late activation of their BWC.

P-26: This stop involved a one-person unit conducting a bicycle stop for a lighting equipment violation. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department member contacted one subject who admitted to possessing narcotics paraphernalia and was searched. The Department member documented the search authority code for the subject as “C-Consent Search.” However, the Department member did not request or obtain consent. The search should have been documented as “E-Evidence of Criminal Activity.”

P-28: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for expired registration. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted two subjects and conducted a consent search of the subject driver and vehicle. The subject passenger was not searched. The Department members accurately documented the search authority code for the subject driver as “C-Consent Search.” However, the Department members did not provide a reason for seeking consent in the narrative.

P-30: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for inoperable taillights. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted two subjects and the subject driver admitted to narcotics paraphernalia. A search of the vehicle was conducted. The Department members documented the search authority code for the vehicle as “C-Consent Search.” However, the Department member did not request or obtain consent. The search should have been documented as “E-Evidence of Criminal Activity.”

P-31: This stop involved a two-person unit conducting a vehicle stop for a broken taillight. A review of the BWC recordings revealed the Department members contacted three subjects and conducted a search of each subject and the vehicle. The Department members accurately documented the search authority codes of the subject driver and vehicle as “C-Consent Search.” However, the Department members did not provide a reason for seeking consent to search the vehicle in the narrative. The subject passengers were not documented in the DDWS log. The subject front passenger search should have been documented as “W-Weapons patdown” and subject back passenger’s search as a “C-Consent search.””

Recommendations

It is recommended the AV Stations implement a training program which emphasizes the importance of accurate documentation for consent searches. The training should prioritize clear and consistent documentation in the MDC data clearance and SACR logs, including providing detailed reasons for seeking consent and recording this interaction on the employee’s BWC.

Additionally, it is recommended the Department develop a BWC recording review process of documented consent searches. Supervisors should regularly review the recordings with the Department members to ensure adherence to search protocols, provide constructive feedback, and deliver additional training details for cases of non-compliance.

CONCLUSION

The AAB considers the findings of this Stops and Detentions audit to be a valuable management tool for the AV Stations. The continued efforts of the AV Stations have been largely successful in their attempts to comply with the terms of the SA and must remain diligent. The AAB recognized the positive strategies employed by the AV supervisors, which impacted station Department members and encouraged them to continue providing the necessary guidance to ultimately meet compliance with the SA.

In some instances, AV Department members demonstrated insufficient awareness of the proper procedures for requesting consent to search and the required documentation for such searches. Additionally, the observed mid-contact deactivations of body-worn cameras (BWC) not only hinder oversight in determining whether BWC requirements were followed but, more critically, increase the risk of allegations of misconduct or unlawful actions, the loss of valuable evidentiary material, and a decline in public trust.

The evidence gathered during this audit strongly suggests the AV Station Department members must remain mindful of areas for improvement, particularly with respect to compliance with Department policies, the stipulations set forth in the Agreement and established compliance metrics.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this section is to provide a concise reference for all recommendations aimed at improving compliance with the Agreement and Department policies and procedures. The recommendations listed below are the same as those detailed in the above report.

Objective No. 1 – Initiating Stops and Detentions

(a) Proper Activation of Body-Worn Camera

It is recommended Department members receive training and briefings emphasizing the requirement to activate their BWC prior to exiting their patrol vehicles or initiating any enforcement or investigative contact with members of the public as mandated by MPP 3-06/200.08. Primary and secondary Department members should be reminded of their shared responsibility to activate BWCs promptly.

Additionally, supervisors should issue Performance Log Entries (PLEs) as informal counseling for first-time or minor lapses. For repeated or more serious violations, particularly those involving the loss of critical recordings, formal documentation or an administrative investigation should be initiated in accordance with Department policy.

Additionally, AV Stations should create a corrective action plan to address Department members who frequently fail to comply with the BWC policy. This must include addressing these violations through verbal counseling or appropriate written documentation as applicable.

(b) Introduction and Stating the Reason for the Stop

During the review, auditors found low compliance percentages for this objective. Many findings exist due to late BWC activations; therefore, auditors were unable to determine compliance with the SA and AB 2773.

It is recommended Department supervisors regularly brief Department members on CA-AB 2773, as well as the terms of the Agreement, and document these briefings in the Station's Watch Commander's Log. During the Daily Stop Audits¹², Station supervisors must ensure the Department members are introducing themselves and stating the reason for the stop when it is reasonable or practicable to do so. If a stop and detention is dynamic at the initiation of a stop, it is important Department members provide the subjects with an introduction once the situation has de-escalated. Department members must also be reminded of the reason for the stop must be stated prior to engaging in questioning related to a criminal investigation or traffic violation. Department members who repeatedly fail to comply should be held accountable through verbal counseling and/or appropriate written documentation, as applicable.

(c) Completeness of BWC Recordings

It is recommended Department members make a concerted effort to consistently keep their BWC activated during a stop and detention from beginning to end. AV Station Department members must be reminded to narrate the reason if they need to de-activate their BWC at any point during the stop and detention.

The AV Stations supervisors should continue conducting practical application exercises to ensure Department members understand the proper procedures for activating and de-activating their BWCs. Supervisors must also include training on the guidelines for BWC deactivations. The MPP 3-06/200.18 – Body Worn Camera Recording Exceptions clearly outlines the three exceptions when Department members are allowed to de-activate their cameras. Supervisors must instill the importance of transparency and emphasize how the completeness of BWC recordings help mitigate risk for both the Department members and the Department.

During the Daily Stop Audits, station supervisors must verify the completeness of Department members' BWC recordings. Department members who demonstrate a pattern of noncompliance must be held accountable through verbal counseling and/or appropriate written documentation, as applicable.

Objective No. 2 – Consent Searches

(a) – Consent Search Request and Response (Person Searches)

It is recommended the AV Stations conduct recurrent briefings to reinforce when consent searches should be requested and how consent should be obtained. Furthermore, it is recommended the AV Stations continue to conduct the "Daily Stops Audits" review process of documented consent searches, wherein supervisors regularly inspect the recordings with the Department members to ensure adherence to search protocols, document constructive feedback, identify any pattern of deficiencies, and provide additional training details for cases of non-compliance.

(c) – Consent Search Request and Response (Vehicle Searches)

To address the shortcomings of the vehicle consent searches, it is recommended AV Stations reinforce the requirement with routine training. This training should include active discussions regarding the requirement of explicit consent before conducting any search and ensure the BWC is activated to capture this consent in compliance with the Agreement. Additionally, the training should also reinforce the need for accurate data input into the MDC log clearance to prevent erroneous documentation. Furthermore, AV Station supervisors should consider creating corrective action plans to address station personnel who frequently fail to comply with the Agreement requirements regarding consent searches and document these violations in a Performance Log Entry (PLE) or Administrative Investigation, if applicable.

(e) – Consent Search of Persons/Vehicle- Articulation and Documentation

To improve compliance, it is recommended to implement a training program which emphasizes the importance of accurate documentation in consent searches. Prioritize clear and consistent documentation in the MDC data clearance and SACR logs, including providing detailed reasons for seeking consent while also recording this interaction on the employee's BWC. Additionally, as previously stated, it is recommended the Department develop a BWC recording review process of documented consent searches, wherein supervisors regularly inspect the recordings with the Department members to ensure adherence to search protocols, document constructive feedback and provide additional training details for cases of non-compliance.

FOLLOW-UP PROCEDURES

The AAB will conduct a follow-up of the recommendations and verify if the auditee has made necessary improvements. Verification of corrective action will be assessed by examining new directives, amended unit orders, and/or relevant documentation. The AAB will work with the auditee in understanding the implementation of audit recommendations, as it may be a lengthy process and require a collaborative effort with other Department resources.

DEPARTMENT APPLICATIONS


- Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) System Services
- LASD.Evidence.com
- Mobile Digital Computer (MDC) log
- RAPSNET

REFERENCES

- Antelope Valley Settlement Agreement Compliance Metrics (October 2019)
- United States Department of Justice – Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department Antelope Valley Settlement Agreement, Case Number CV 15-03174 (April 2015)
- Antelope Valley Settlement Agreement, Case Number CV 15-03174 (April 2015)
- California Assembly Bill 2773 (2024)
- Manual of Policy and Procedures Sections:
 - MPP 3-01/000.05 (2023)
 - MPP 5-09/520.05 (2017)

Views of Responsible Officials

On August 5, 2025, the AAB submitted a summary of findings to the AV Station command staff. The AAB presented the final audit report to the Division Director, Office of Constitutional Policing.

	12/31/25
MARIA G. KUEHL	DATE
Acting Captain	
Audit and Accountability Bureau	
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department	